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¿Por qué hay tanta corrupción en España?
La principal causa de los escándalos es el alto número de cargos de designación política en las instituciones nacionales, autonómicas y locales. Son redes clientelares que viven de que su partido gane las elecciones
VÍCTOR LAPUENTE GINÉ 27 MAR 2009
Why is there so much corruption in Spain?
The main cause of the scandals is the high number of political appointees at the national, regional and local. They are living patronage networks that his party wins the election
VICTOR LAPUENTE GINÉ 27 MAR 2009
The main cause of the scandals is the high number of political appointees at the national, regional and local. They are living patronage networks that his party wins the election
VICTOR LAPUENTE GINÉ 27 MAR 2009
For those who study the comparative level corruption, the recent wave of scandals in Spain represents no surprise. Countries such as France, Italy, Portugal and Spain have spent years showing levels of corruption and quality of government-like authoritarian countries to developing the advanced capitalist democracies own decades of membership in the OECD. What factors separate these countries, particularly Spain, of the free democracies of corruption?
The first temptation to be avoided is to say that corruption is "our culture". This is a dangerous argument and intellectually unsatisfactory, but, however, has a certain prestige in some circles, possibly the same who said not long ago that representative democracy or capitalism had no place in our Mediterranean culture and / or Catholic. Like a growing number of studies are showing, causality seems to go in any case in the opposite direction: developing countries 'bad' cultures, or cultures dominated social distrust as a result of high levels of corruption.
In the U.S., the mayor can not put a lot of people. The City to manage professional
In many European cities only three or four people are named by the winning party
A second temptation to avoid is the urge legalistic, with deeply rooted in Spain, one of the world's countries with a higher proportion of lawyers in their administrations. From a legalistic view, exposed, for example, by the Court of Auditors a report on local corruption, which would explain the same in Spain would be "lack of regulation" that "allow for a margin of discretion, not always consistent with the protecting the public interest. " But can anyone really believe that the solution to local corruption is to regulate each and every one of the activities of these authorities?
Surprise compare the attitude of our Court of Auditors with their Nordic counterparts: in them, rather than items with detailed procedures, are just some PowerPoint presentation noting that the objective is to avoid a "poor accounting", leaving almost absolute discretion to auditors public on how to carry out its audit work.
As the modern literature on corruption noted, the causes of corruption does not lie in a "bad culture" or insufficient regulation, but in the politicization of public institutions. Government more prone to corruption are those with a greater number of public employees who owe their position to a political appointment. And here, the contrast between Spain and European countries with low levels of corruption is significant. In a European city of 100,000 to 500,000 people may have, including the mayor, two or three people whose income depends on the party X wins the election. In Spain, the party that controls a local government may appoint many officials and advisers, and at the same time, weaving a network of agencies and foundations with full discretion in personnel policy. In total, an average Spanish city can have hundreds of people whose salaries depend on the party X wins the election.
This creates many perverse incentives for corruption. Public employees work with a horizon limited by the uncertainty of the upcoming elections are more likely to accept or solicit bribes in exchange for favorable treatment to government employees with a stable contract. Second, unlike what happens in most of the Western world, where local politicians are forced to make decisions with officials who would be willing to report any suspicion of preferential treatment in Spain throughout the chain of decision of a public policy is in the hands of people who share a common goal: to win elections. This makes it more easily tolerate illegal behavior, and that having more at stake in elections, the temptations to give favored treatment in exchange for illegal funding for the match are also higher.
What can we do to reduce this politicization? The experience of other countries is illustrative. For example, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many U.S. cities had high levels of politicization and corruption as stratospheric as those reflected in the film Gangs of New York, where the government of the city is captured by patronage networks and even criminals. A few years later, the extensive politicization of local governments, and in his hand, corruption, fell dramatically due to institutional reforms and the replacement of the type of government strong-major (the type of local government which prevails in Spain, in which a single elected official, the mayor and his governing majority, accumulates a lot of power) by the so-called city-manager. In this new form of government, elected officials retain the legislative, but executive power passed into the hands of a professional manager appointed by a qualified majority of councilors for a period of time does not coincide with the electoral cycle, thereby reducing the degree political dependency.
This type of government, or variants thereof, has been adopted by local governments of Western countries that have lower levels of corruption. In them, the party that wins the election has "hands tied" when making appointments, because there is a professional manager who manages the administrative organization, or you must reach broad agreements with other political forces, often including the of the opposition, to appoint to public office. In general, try to find institutional mechanisms for public employees are selected whose continuance in office depends on their competence or merit rather than political loyalty.
Importantly, the level of employee competence is not synonymous with what is traditionally interpreted as the merit system in Spain, that is, some public officials selected by competitive examination and a square "property" for life, regardless their performance. Empirical evidence shows that it is not necessary to have a full administration officials to reduce corruption. For example, the two least corrupt countries in the world in 2008, Sweden and New Zealand, eliminated civil service status for years for the vast majority of public employees, which currently are governed by the same labor legislation than any private sector worker .
Can we expect in Spain to a more flexible and efficient administration and, in turn, less corrupt? The main obstacle here is that public debate is caught between two competing visions and undesirable both. On the one hand, political parties, relying on the traditional rigidity of public administration have fostered institutions that allow high politicization of the administration and therefore give rise to corruption. In addition, representatives of the bodies of officials who advocate the maintenance of a public employee tenure. Who obviously pays the inefficiencies resulting from politicization and administrative rigidity are citizens.
Although this situation seems irreversible, the experience of other contexts must instil optimism. When activists like Richard Childs, businessman and promoter of a type of local government based on professional managers as those in the private sector began their improbable fight against politicization and corruption that plagued the majority of administrative levels in the United States for For over a century, faced client networks whose power seemed impregnable. However, succeeded because they were able to mobilize the interests of those that ultimately generated the wealth of the country, convincing them that it was wasted not bad public policy, but with bad politicians, or rather, with the persistence of bad institutions used by politicians to support their client networks. Can anyone in Spain mobilize those interests?
Victor Lapuente Giné is Professor of Political Science at the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden).
The first temptation to be avoided is to say that corruption is "our culture". This is a dangerous argument and intellectually unsatisfactory, but, however, has a certain prestige in some circles, possibly the same who said not long ago that representative democracy or capitalism had no place in our Mediterranean culture and / or Catholic. Like a growing number of studies are showing, causality seems to go in any case in the opposite direction: developing countries 'bad' cultures, or cultures dominated social distrust as a result of high levels of corruption.
In the U.S., the mayor can not put a lot of people. The City to manage professional
In many European cities only three or four people are named by the winning party
A second temptation to avoid is the urge legalistic, with deeply rooted in Spain, one of the world's countries with a higher proportion of lawyers in their administrations. From a legalistic view, exposed, for example, by the Court of Auditors a report on local corruption, which would explain the same in Spain would be "lack of regulation" that "allow for a margin of discretion, not always consistent with the protecting the public interest. " But can anyone really believe that the solution to local corruption is to regulate each and every one of the activities of these authorities?
Surprise compare the attitude of our Court of Auditors with their Nordic counterparts: in them, rather than items with detailed procedures, are just some PowerPoint presentation noting that the objective is to avoid a "poor accounting", leaving almost absolute discretion to auditors public on how to carry out its audit work.
As the modern literature on corruption noted, the causes of corruption does not lie in a "bad culture" or insufficient regulation, but in the politicization of public institutions. Government more prone to corruption are those with a greater number of public employees who owe their position to a political appointment. And here, the contrast between Spain and European countries with low levels of corruption is significant. In a European city of 100,000 to 500,000 people may have, including the mayor, two or three people whose income depends on the party X wins the election. In Spain, the party that controls a local government may appoint many officials and advisers, and at the same time, weaving a network of agencies and foundations with full discretion in personnel policy. In total, an average Spanish city can have hundreds of people whose salaries depend on the party X wins the election.
This creates many perverse incentives for corruption. Public employees work with a horizon limited by the uncertainty of the upcoming elections are more likely to accept or solicit bribes in exchange for favorable treatment to government employees with a stable contract. Second, unlike what happens in most of the Western world, where local politicians are forced to make decisions with officials who would be willing to report any suspicion of preferential treatment in Spain throughout the chain of decision of a public policy is in the hands of people who share a common goal: to win elections. This makes it more easily tolerate illegal behavior, and that having more at stake in elections, the temptations to give favored treatment in exchange for illegal funding for the match are also higher.
What can we do to reduce this politicization? The experience of other countries is illustrative. For example, during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries many U.S. cities had high levels of politicization and corruption as stratospheric as those reflected in the film Gangs of New York, where the government of the city is captured by patronage networks and even criminals. A few years later, the extensive politicization of local governments, and in his hand, corruption, fell dramatically due to institutional reforms and the replacement of the type of government strong-major (the type of local government which prevails in Spain, in which a single elected official, the mayor and his governing majority, accumulates a lot of power) by the so-called city-manager. In this new form of government, elected officials retain the legislative, but executive power passed into the hands of a professional manager appointed by a qualified majority of councilors for a period of time does not coincide with the electoral cycle, thereby reducing the degree political dependency.
This type of government, or variants thereof, has been adopted by local governments of Western countries that have lower levels of corruption. In them, the party that wins the election has "hands tied" when making appointments, because there is a professional manager who manages the administrative organization, or you must reach broad agreements with other political forces, often including the of the opposition, to appoint to public office. In general, try to find institutional mechanisms for public employees are selected whose continuance in office depends on their competence or merit rather than political loyalty.
Importantly, the level of employee competence is not synonymous with what is traditionally interpreted as the merit system in Spain, that is, some public officials selected by competitive examination and a square "property" for life, regardless their performance. Empirical evidence shows that it is not necessary to have a full administration officials to reduce corruption. For example, the two least corrupt countries in the world in 2008, Sweden and New Zealand, eliminated civil service status for years for the vast majority of public employees, which currently are governed by the same labor legislation than any private sector worker .
Can we expect in Spain to a more flexible and efficient administration and, in turn, less corrupt? The main obstacle here is that public debate is caught between two competing visions and undesirable both. On the one hand, political parties, relying on the traditional rigidity of public administration have fostered institutions that allow high politicization of the administration and therefore give rise to corruption. In addition, representatives of the bodies of officials who advocate the maintenance of a public employee tenure. Who obviously pays the inefficiencies resulting from politicization and administrative rigidity are citizens.
Although this situation seems irreversible, the experience of other contexts must instil optimism. When activists like Richard Childs, businessman and promoter of a type of local government based on professional managers as those in the private sector began their improbable fight against politicization and corruption that plagued the majority of administrative levels in the United States for For over a century, faced client networks whose power seemed impregnable. However, succeeded because they were able to mobilize the interests of those that ultimately generated the wealth of the country, convincing them that it was wasted not bad public policy, but with bad politicians, or rather, with the persistence of bad institutions used by politicians to support their client networks. Can anyone in Spain mobilize those interests?
Victor Lapuente Giné is Professor of Political Science at the Quality of Government Institute at the University of Gothenburg (Sweden).
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