EL PAIS
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スペインのCaja Castilla y La Mancha信用金庫の破綻(破産);2009年03月29日 、不効率、危機管理の無さ、過剰な不動産への投資
Caja Castilla-La Mancha, el aviso de una crisis que nadie quiso oír
CCM, que fue la primera entidad en caer, era un mapa de los peligros para el sector
El mal control del riesgo y el exceso de crédito al ladrillo acabaron con la caja
EL PAÍS abre con este artículo una serie sobre el hundimiento de las cajas de ahorros
Caja Castilla-La Mancha, notice of a crisis that nobody wanted to hear
CCM, which was the first bank to fall, was a map of the dangers for the sector
Poor control of risk and the excess credit to the brick finished with the box
THE COUNTRY This article opens with a series on the collapse of the savings banks
Inigo de Madrid Barron 24 JUN 2012 - 02:19 CET
CCM, which was the first bank to fall, was a map of the dangers for the sector
Poor control of risk and the excess credit to the brick finished with the box
THE COUNTRY This article opens with a series on the collapse of the savings banks
Inigo de Madrid Barron 24 JUN 2012 - 02:19 CET
The death of Caja Castilla-La Mancha (CCM) was not quick or casual. It happened on March 29, 2009. The victim had huge complications for real estate. He realized that his end was near, called for help, sought alliances ... but no one came to his rescue. His reputation was very touched.
Thus came the end of CCM, which was the proof that the financial crisis had come to Spain. The body was left Cajastur and diluted the dream that the financial system would emerge unscathed from the crisis by strong countercyclical provisions. Of course, the political, economic and Bank of Spain, minimized the fall of the giant Castilian, which brought five cases and was the twelfth sector with 19,000 million in assets.
The fall of CCM alarmed the international press, while he downplayed the PSOE government
X-CCM crisis shows all the evils that have afflicted after the boxes have sunk: ineffective and outdated risk control, over-investment in real estate, a rapidly expanding outside their region of origin, destination Lift main and excessive financing in international wholesale markets. The specialty of CCM was having a huge industrial corporation which stood the dilapidated airport of Ciudad Real and the vague plan of the Kingdom of Don Quixote. CCM were financed by the regional government driven and in partnership with employers in the Brick area, when the real estate cycle was running out.
To get an idea of how bad it was the entity just look at the accounts of 2011. The NPL ratio was 26.38%, which is reduced to 6% if we eliminate the loans covered by the Asset Protection Scheme (APS). Last year the credit fell by 6.3% and deposits decreased by 12.51%. The benefit was testimonial, 72,000 euros. Land on its balance sheet is valued at 1,680 million, a figure very high, but lower than the 1,991 million 2010.
President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero was the first to play down the failure of the organization headed by former deputy Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto socialist. "Only accounts for 0.8% of the assets of the financial system," said Zapatero.
A bankruptcy without compensation
• Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto, president since 1999, collected 150,000 euros a year. After surgery, had received no compensation or right to strike.
• The former was fined 155,000 euros by the Bank of Spain, which disqualified for five years. Anti concluded that there was no enrichment office. Is pending a trial on a complaint of unfair administration.
• The CEO, Ildefonso Ortega, placed in office by the PP, the Bank of Spain opened seven cases of seven very serious offenses.
• Ortega was fined 150,000 euros and lost retirement pension. Anti said it was enriched in the exercise of his office.
However, the fall of CCM alarmed the Spanish public opinion and, above all, the international press, which said that the subprime Spanish was hidden in the brick, as shown later. Part of the concern came to prepare for the closure of CCM was necessary to convene a cabinet meeting on Sunday, something unusual in a democracy.
Despite statements of Zapatero, soon became the flagship La Mancha would have a resounding end. When a financial institution bankruptcy there is a risk of generating a much larger problem that caused the failure. Fear may fester and try savers withdraw their money en masse.
This collective madness had already occurred in the state Mancha Castilian. On January 21, 2009, in the town of Toledo in Los Yébenes bank run came weeks before the intervention. Officially, the nervousness started from a rumor and a fatal confusion. A local radio station in Toledo, Consuegra Radio reported that a small door manufacturing company, ITM, had broken. Some neighbors knew that it was CCM. From there, the news spread like wildfire through the village streets and neighbors flocked to withdraw their money. The queues outside the branches of CCM in Los Yébenes grew and Toledo headquarters had to send trucks with money.
Exejecutivos Some say the entity was not accidental. In private entrepreneurs cite names similar to the PP in the area, which they blame for feeding the rumor. What happened in Los Yébenes was a test of the true end of the box. CCM did not break just because dragging a solvency problem for their wrong investment property, but for lack of liquidity. Cancer Brick joined myocardial lack of money.
Throughout March 2009, the PP of Castilla-La Mancha, led by Maria Dolores de Cospedal, encouraged a campaign against the solvency of the entity in a war in which he also attacked the regional government of José María Barreda. Entrepreneurs related to PP led to the withdrawal of deposits. As further demonstrated by the statistics of the box, in a few weeks it took about 5,000 million. Many millions of these were injected by the Bank of Spain, until he saw that the hole had no end and said enough by intervention.
The campaign against CCM Cospedal PP led to the escape of 5,000 million of deposits
"It was a blast from inside," recalls former President Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto, noting that three former officials of the box, PP members, refused to abandon her in her last days to strengthen the board even though his party were forced to resign. Molto was not president. The CEO was Ildefonso Ortega, who was in the state when it was under the control of PP.
In 2008, Molto saw approaching the end of CCM and tried to prevent his fall merger. Contacted three entities: the first with Ibercaja, which was unsuccessful for a PwC report (audit in which he worked and Luis de Guindos), which stated that the hole was about 3,000 million and then there were talks with Cajastur shallow.
But who else away with Unicaja reached was chaired by Braulio Medel, who asked 2,000 million in grants and guarantees for bad loans. The Bank of Spain refused to grant them after a game of pocker which also played Jose Antonio Grin, president of the Andalusian, who kept a sharp confrontation with the governor, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez.
The box Ibercaja negotiated, Cajastur and Unicaja a merger to avoid intervention
The legislation was outdated and greatly handicapped the change of control. In fact until September 2010 did not take the reins Cajastur the entity Mancha. Still there was no Bank Restructuring Fund and any account paid the Guarantee Fund savings banks, savings lost almost 75% of the assets accumulated over decades.
In the end, CCM drop out more expensive than if it had been Unicaja: 2,475 million in guarantees for the bad loans that may appear to 1,300 million in capital.
With this background, it is not surprising that the word risk appears everywhere when discussing future goals CCM Bank: improving the quality of investments, failed to recover costs and apply rational. The most striking aspect of this crisis is that while in the ruins of CCM was the map of the dangers of the industry, neither the supervisor nor anyone took steps to mitigate the collapse of the system.
Thus came the end of CCM, which was the proof that the financial crisis had come to Spain. The body was left Cajastur and diluted the dream that the financial system would emerge unscathed from the crisis by strong countercyclical provisions. Of course, the political, economic and Bank of Spain, minimized the fall of the giant Castilian, which brought five cases and was the twelfth sector with 19,000 million in assets.
The fall of CCM alarmed the international press, while he downplayed the PSOE government
X-CCM crisis shows all the evils that have afflicted after the boxes have sunk: ineffective and outdated risk control, over-investment in real estate, a rapidly expanding outside their region of origin, destination Lift main and excessive financing in international wholesale markets. The specialty of CCM was having a huge industrial corporation which stood the dilapidated airport of Ciudad Real and the vague plan of the Kingdom of Don Quixote. CCM were financed by the regional government driven and in partnership with employers in the Brick area, when the real estate cycle was running out.
To get an idea of how bad it was the entity just look at the accounts of 2011. The NPL ratio was 26.38%, which is reduced to 6% if we eliminate the loans covered by the Asset Protection Scheme (APS). Last year the credit fell by 6.3% and deposits decreased by 12.51%. The benefit was testimonial, 72,000 euros. Land on its balance sheet is valued at 1,680 million, a figure very high, but lower than the 1,991 million 2010.
President Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero was the first to play down the failure of the organization headed by former deputy Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto socialist. "Only accounts for 0.8% of the assets of the financial system," said Zapatero.
A bankruptcy without compensation
• Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto, president since 1999, collected 150,000 euros a year. After surgery, had received no compensation or right to strike.
• The former was fined 155,000 euros by the Bank of Spain, which disqualified for five years. Anti concluded that there was no enrichment office. Is pending a trial on a complaint of unfair administration.
• The CEO, Ildefonso Ortega, placed in office by the PP, the Bank of Spain opened seven cases of seven very serious offenses.
• Ortega was fined 150,000 euros and lost retirement pension. Anti said it was enriched in the exercise of his office.
However, the fall of CCM alarmed the Spanish public opinion and, above all, the international press, which said that the subprime Spanish was hidden in the brick, as shown later. Part of the concern came to prepare for the closure of CCM was necessary to convene a cabinet meeting on Sunday, something unusual in a democracy.
Despite statements of Zapatero, soon became the flagship La Mancha would have a resounding end. When a financial institution bankruptcy there is a risk of generating a much larger problem that caused the failure. Fear may fester and try savers withdraw their money en masse.
This collective madness had already occurred in the state Mancha Castilian. On January 21, 2009, in the town of Toledo in Los Yébenes bank run came weeks before the intervention. Officially, the nervousness started from a rumor and a fatal confusion. A local radio station in Toledo, Consuegra Radio reported that a small door manufacturing company, ITM, had broken. Some neighbors knew that it was CCM. From there, the news spread like wildfire through the village streets and neighbors flocked to withdraw their money. The queues outside the branches of CCM in Los Yébenes grew and Toledo headquarters had to send trucks with money.
Exejecutivos Some say the entity was not accidental. In private entrepreneurs cite names similar to the PP in the area, which they blame for feeding the rumor. What happened in Los Yébenes was a test of the true end of the box. CCM did not break just because dragging a solvency problem for their wrong investment property, but for lack of liquidity. Cancer Brick joined myocardial lack of money.
Throughout March 2009, the PP of Castilla-La Mancha, led by Maria Dolores de Cospedal, encouraged a campaign against the solvency of the entity in a war in which he also attacked the regional government of José María Barreda. Entrepreneurs related to PP led to the withdrawal of deposits. As further demonstrated by the statistics of the box, in a few weeks it took about 5,000 million. Many millions of these were injected by the Bank of Spain, until he saw that the hole had no end and said enough by intervention.
The campaign against CCM Cospedal PP led to the escape of 5,000 million of deposits
"It was a blast from inside," recalls former President Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto, noting that three former officials of the box, PP members, refused to abandon her in her last days to strengthen the board even though his party were forced to resign. Molto was not president. The CEO was Ildefonso Ortega, who was in the state when it was under the control of PP.
In 2008, Molto saw approaching the end of CCM and tried to prevent his fall merger. Contacted three entities: the first with Ibercaja, which was unsuccessful for a PwC report (audit in which he worked and Luis de Guindos), which stated that the hole was about 3,000 million and then there were talks with Cajastur shallow.
But who else away with Unicaja reached was chaired by Braulio Medel, who asked 2,000 million in grants and guarantees for bad loans. The Bank of Spain refused to grant them after a game of pocker which also played Jose Antonio Grin, president of the Andalusian, who kept a sharp confrontation with the governor, Miguel Fernández Ordóñez.
The box Ibercaja negotiated, Cajastur and Unicaja a merger to avoid intervention
The legislation was outdated and greatly handicapped the change of control. In fact until September 2010 did not take the reins Cajastur the entity Mancha. Still there was no Bank Restructuring Fund and any account paid the Guarantee Fund savings banks, savings lost almost 75% of the assets accumulated over decades.
In the end, CCM drop out more expensive than if it had been Unicaja: 2,475 million in guarantees for the bad loans that may appear to 1,300 million in capital.
With this background, it is not surprising that the word risk appears everywhere when discussing future goals CCM Bank: improving the quality of investments, failed to recover costs and apply rational. The most striking aspect of this crisis is that while in the ruins of CCM was the map of the dangers of the industry, neither the supervisor nor anyone took steps to mitigate the collapse of the system.
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