スペイン政府の企業破産法を改正は、借金に苦しむ企業の債務の貸り換えを促進して、企業の倒産を防ぐ手立てに。(失業者の増大を防ぐ)
Objetivo: evitar la bancarrota
Las nuevas normas de refinanciación buscan sortear el concurso de acreedores
Amanda Mars Madrid 16 MAR 2014 - 00:00 CET
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Objective: avoid bankruptcy
The new rules seek to circumvent the refinancing bankruptcy
Amanda Mars Madrid 16 MAR 2014 - 00:00 CET
One of the last to fall was Cegasa . The manufacturer of batteries and bulbs last week asked the bankruptcy and was admitted by the court. Joins the Spanish companies that suspended payments in 2014 , along with the historic signing of Galician or ceramic Sagardelos Zinkia , the content producer who created the character Pocoyo . Since 2010, some 30,000 companies have ended up in bankruptcy , resulting in job losses and loss of productive . The Government has approved a major reform to facilitate refinancing and avoid companies with good operational but runaway debt, go bankrupt , insolvent or what is technically known as bankruptcy , that in 9 out of 10 cases usually involve the end of the company .
" Pescanova would be a typical example of a company with good business, but a suffocating debt " , sources in the Ministry of Economy, although the process is late for the Galician company, which introduced the contest last year also involved in a number of irregularities accounting and hidden liabilities . But the government has identified 350 companies with more than 100,000 million aggregate that could benefit from new framework for debt refinancing .
The objective is to avoid competition because in addition to the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the various creditors, just sometimes failing because the operation of the business is complicated after the competition. The change in name to the euphemistic bankruptcy bankruptcy does not end with the stigma for a company that is in this situation : many banks cut financing lines , as explained by the experts, and vendors leave legit goods .
Therefore, almost all changes are concentrated in the so-called pre-insolvency phase, when the judge that no open negotiations for debt restructuring communicates . Although there are certain areas that maintain their protective covenants , amendments offer outings complicated situations. Bondholders gaming company Codere who own 50 % of the debt , for example, indicated in a statement that the new rules will prevent the entry of the company in competition , as the majority shareholder may impose an agreement or administrator believe it serves the general interest of society.
■ Brake executions . Negotiations to reach an agreement with creditors and avoid bankruptcy can be ruined if in full conversation, any of the lenders decide to run your debt and seize any property that the company needs to continue operating. Now , when the company communicates to judge the beginning of the talks, the possible executions paralyzed for four months. For example , a hotel company can only lose the title to a property if the purpose of holding and not stop him with their exploitation. Moreover , with 51 % agreement of creditors can avoid execution.
■ Facilities for fresh money. Capital injections you can receive a company in refinancing agreements will be considered claims against the estate , ie , loans receivable priority in bankruptcy. This condition, which affected 50 % before liquidity and now 100%, governed for two years after the loan even if the lender is related to the firm.
■ Agreements protected. Companies can reach agreement with a creditor refinancing without majorities always to achieve an improvement of the financial position of the company. This agreement can not be terminated by the court unless requested by the trustee that does not meet the requirement of improving equity . As for judicially approved and non-approved collective agreements , the requirement of the independent expert is replaced by the auditor 's certificate certifying passive majorities necessary .
■ lower pacts to achieve majorities . The majority needed to approve judicial agreement from 55% to 51% and this percentage also no longer calculated on most liabilities held by banks , but on the financial debt ( excluding trade and administrations ) narrows . Furthermore , syndicated agreements previously required unanimity and only need 75 % of liabilities.
■ actual less immune Guarantees and forced dissidents. When 60% of the creditors of financial liabilities Executed deferred payment or conversion into equity loans up to five years , measures to extend dissident creditors without collateral. Also, if 75 % of creditors to reach an agreement , dissidents must also take up to 10 years waiting , remove , credit conversion into shares or transfer of goods as payment , among others. Accounts receivable related to a security (mortgages, for example) will also be affected by the covenants in the amount that exceeds the value of the collateral (eg, if the credit is worth 100 , but the warranty 90 10 this difference.) Up to the value of the guarantee itself the effect of the covenant extends when the majorities reach 65% and 80% computed .
■ Contra funds or opportunistic vultures . Such investors are on the hunt for toxic assets to extract the maximum performance advantage sometimes to the defaults , with very small holdings ( 5% , for example), boycott any refinancing agreement and sell his vote in favor change of greater benefit than other creditors. With the new rules , the vulture funds should have much higher stakes . Economy argues that " a majority investor, with 30% or 35 % , precedence viability of the company to get a return ."
■ The debt to the government and workers , reinforced . Of all battery changes , the debts of the company with the government ( Treasury or Social Security) and its workers are marginalized because they retain their status as separate creditor . This is a limitation for smaller companies , the bulk of commitments generally correspond with these agents. Ministry sources said these defaults show that the signature is not operationally feasible .
■ Promote the conversion of debt into equity . The guilt of the administrator of the company and the shareholders who refuse to such agreement without reasonable cause shall be presumed and therefore runs the company into insolvency . Reasonable cause shall be determined by the report of an independent expert. The balance point is based on the value of the payment amount to the required participation . Funding for the creditor to become a shareholder or holder of subordinated units will not be considered (and therefore less priority collection ) as would happen to an ordinary shareholder. And besides, if converting debt reaches 30 % of the capital of a listed company on the Stock Exchange and has the approval of the judge, waiving a takeover bid is successful, as would be mandatory .
■ The effect on bank accounts . If financial institutions convert their debt into capital, can be released provisions ( made to guard against the probable default of a debt) , but also to have a new asset and corresponding risk , should increase their capital. The Ministry estimates that this operation will not penalize banks because losses are already taken and in no case capital requirements exceed the provisions that can be reduced , since the loan covering either ceases to exist or becomes considered Normal risk ( and , therefore, requires less supply ) . The Bank of Spain must make public the criteria for classification as normal risk and will be based on the strength of the viability plan of the company.
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