http://elpais.com
スペインのBanco de Valencias の破綻;政治介入、過剰な不動産投資、犯罪紛いの経営
Capitalismo de amiguetes
Injerencia política, excesos inmobiliarios y supuestos delitos marcaron Banco de Valencia
Ignacio Zafra Valencia29 JUN 2012 - 21:12 CET
Crony capitalism
Political interference, excess property and alleged crimes marked Banco de Valencia
Ignacio Zafra Valencia 29 JUN 2012 - 21:12 CET
Political interference, excess property and alleged crimes marked Banco de Valencia
Ignacio Zafra Valencia 29 JUN 2012 - 21:12 CET
The Banco de Valencia, the historical aspiration of the local bourgeoisie, hanging by a thread. Intervened in November 2011 after detecting a hole of 548 million that has not stopped growing, the bank is facing a bad way and another worse. The bad would be that, as expected, the Bank Restructuring Fund (FROB), who has just 1,000 million euros injected seizing 91% of the capital, find a buyer willing to keep it at auction (now postponed) receive more aid in return, yet difficult to quantify. The worst is that, as suggested by the European Commissioner for Competition, Joaquin Almunia, although may also refer to Catalunya Caixa and Banco Novagalicia-the cost-benefit analysis and severe voltage across the Spanish public debt the government take to liquidate .
It would be the end of a bank founded in 1900 which enjoyed its best between the twenties and thirties of last century, the stage of bourgeois notables Valencia were made with the entity. The Valencia funded agricultural enterprises, but also trams, electricity, urban businesses and exporting industries. Grew enough to give the impression to be placed "between the past, but within the larger national banks," says Professor Ródenas Clementina.
more informationI. Caja Castilla-La Mancha, notice that no one wanted to hearII. Cajasur, the case of the Church, also joined the party of the brickIII. "The worst of the worst" was the CAMIV. Managers out of control and docile political dynamite NovacaixagaliciaV. Caixa Catalunya, the box was mounted on the brickVI. Unnim, the price of leaving the region
That dream faded after the Civil War. Valencia became part of the Central Bank and limited to the regional level. Over the years, surpassed in size by the Caja de Valencia (after Bancaja), which eventually purchasing it in 1994. That year came on the scene who would be CEO of the entity to its intervention, Domingo Parra, main character with José Luis Olivas of the fall of the bank.
De Olivas know almost everything. Lawyer in the seventies and professional politician since. Councillor in the City of Valencia with UCD and the PP. Author of the law that handed control of the boxes to the autonomous government. President of the Government for 10 months between Eduardo Zaplana and Francisco Camps. And finally, president of Bancaja and Banco Valencia.
Domingo Parra is, however, more unknown, although the local business circles for years considered him one of the three most powerful men in Valencia, behind the president of the Generalitat and the president of Bancaja. Three firms that also were connected.
Domingo Parra was named CEO of Banco de Valencia because he was considered an expert in financial risk
Parra was named CEO of Banco de Valencia, above all, because he was considered an expert in financial risk. The paradox is that, 17 years later, the main reason for the collapse of the bank was the excessive concentration of risk in real estate, which reached 65.8%, when the industry average was 59%. The latest data available from the state, and after the intervention, portray a bad management. "A default rate of 16.4%, double the industry average, a solvency ratio of 1.7%, well below the requirement of 8%, a capital shortfall of 997 million," and a mountain ahead to meet the new requirements for consolidation of real estate assets, says Professor Joachim Maudos.
The former CEO also committed, apparently from FROB, in criminal proceedings at the expense of the bank, which would have enriched him and businessmen with whom I was friendly. Especially the president of Aguas de Valencia, Eugenio Calabuig, as stated in the complaint filed in the High Court.
Mutation of the CEO, taken as a first step in the bank as a business manager and responsible and later author of such management, should be understood, according to various sources, under the economic and cultural change experienced by Spain and Valencia especially with the rise of Zaplana to the Generalitat and the subsequent step of Camps. The autonomous government placed the boxes (and thus the bank) to your service. The technical criteria were interfered with by politicians ever. And official support to developers, whom he described Zaplana late nineties as new social leaders, strengthened its excessive inclination real estate. A trend exacerbated by the entry of Olives to the chairs of Bancaja and Valencia in 2004.
The first to warn about the reliability of their numbers was the president of Rodrigo Rato Bankia
Submitted to the imposing housing bubble, follow the same sources, Parra endiosó. The branch network between 2000 and 2008 grew by 82%, well above the sector. In 2009, when the cold sweat ran the financial institutions at the prospect of being trapped for millions of square meters in floor and soil, Parra decided that the bank bought the promoter Calabuig Eugenio, Costa Bellver, by 107 million euros, when their assets (undeveloped land) amounted to 10 million. In the months before the intervention, the entity financed the bonds Jaume Matas, former Balearic convicted of corruption, a close friend of Parra and Camps in the case of suits.
The management of the bank is now in court. The first to warn about the reliability of their numbers was, however, the president of Bankia Rodrigo Rato, who in February ordered audit the value that actually had the Bancaja Valencia when the group, to which he belonged, merged with Caja Madrid, because Olivas was convinced that his partner in the CP, had deceived him.
The complaint against exgestores FROB Banco de Valencia also includes Aurelio Left
The complaint against exgestores FROB Banco de Valencia also includes, as a possible beneficiary of the alleged offenses, Aurelio Izquierdo. Olivas right hand in Bancaja, Left relieved him as president of Banco de Valencia in October 2011, a position he held out a few weeks until it was taken over by the Bank of Spain.
Izquierdo, who Olivas recovered yet this spring as CFO of Bancaja, starred in a controversy a few weeks ago when it emerged that he was entitled to receive nearly 14 million euros of savings in compensation. Left has finally given up about half, and will receive 7.6 million euros.
It would be the end of a bank founded in 1900 which enjoyed its best between the twenties and thirties of last century, the stage of bourgeois notables Valencia were made with the entity. The Valencia funded agricultural enterprises, but also trams, electricity, urban businesses and exporting industries. Grew enough to give the impression to be placed "between the past, but within the larger national banks," says Professor Ródenas Clementina.
more informationI. Caja Castilla-La Mancha, notice that no one wanted to hearII. Cajasur, the case of the Church, also joined the party of the brickIII. "The worst of the worst" was the CAMIV. Managers out of control and docile political dynamite NovacaixagaliciaV. Caixa Catalunya, the box was mounted on the brickVI. Unnim, the price of leaving the region
That dream faded after the Civil War. Valencia became part of the Central Bank and limited to the regional level. Over the years, surpassed in size by the Caja de Valencia (after Bancaja), which eventually purchasing it in 1994. That year came on the scene who would be CEO of the entity to its intervention, Domingo Parra, main character with José Luis Olivas of the fall of the bank.
De Olivas know almost everything. Lawyer in the seventies and professional politician since. Councillor in the City of Valencia with UCD and the PP. Author of the law that handed control of the boxes to the autonomous government. President of the Government for 10 months between Eduardo Zaplana and Francisco Camps. And finally, president of Bancaja and Banco Valencia.
Domingo Parra is, however, more unknown, although the local business circles for years considered him one of the three most powerful men in Valencia, behind the president of the Generalitat and the president of Bancaja. Three firms that also were connected.
Domingo Parra was named CEO of Banco de Valencia because he was considered an expert in financial risk
Parra was named CEO of Banco de Valencia, above all, because he was considered an expert in financial risk. The paradox is that, 17 years later, the main reason for the collapse of the bank was the excessive concentration of risk in real estate, which reached 65.8%, when the industry average was 59%. The latest data available from the state, and after the intervention, portray a bad management. "A default rate of 16.4%, double the industry average, a solvency ratio of 1.7%, well below the requirement of 8%, a capital shortfall of 997 million," and a mountain ahead to meet the new requirements for consolidation of real estate assets, says Professor Joachim Maudos.
The former CEO also committed, apparently from FROB, in criminal proceedings at the expense of the bank, which would have enriched him and businessmen with whom I was friendly. Especially the president of Aguas de Valencia, Eugenio Calabuig, as stated in the complaint filed in the High Court.
Mutation of the CEO, taken as a first step in the bank as a business manager and responsible and later author of such management, should be understood, according to various sources, under the economic and cultural change experienced by Spain and Valencia especially with the rise of Zaplana to the Generalitat and the subsequent step of Camps. The autonomous government placed the boxes (and thus the bank) to your service. The technical criteria were interfered with by politicians ever. And official support to developers, whom he described Zaplana late nineties as new social leaders, strengthened its excessive inclination real estate. A trend exacerbated by the entry of Olives to the chairs of Bancaja and Valencia in 2004.
The first to warn about the reliability of their numbers was the president of Rodrigo Rato Bankia
Submitted to the imposing housing bubble, follow the same sources, Parra endiosó. The branch network between 2000 and 2008 grew by 82%, well above the sector. In 2009, when the cold sweat ran the financial institutions at the prospect of being trapped for millions of square meters in floor and soil, Parra decided that the bank bought the promoter Calabuig Eugenio, Costa Bellver, by 107 million euros, when their assets (undeveloped land) amounted to 10 million. In the months before the intervention, the entity financed the bonds Jaume Matas, former Balearic convicted of corruption, a close friend of Parra and Camps in the case of suits.
The management of the bank is now in court. The first to warn about the reliability of their numbers was, however, the president of Bankia Rodrigo Rato, who in February ordered audit the value that actually had the Bancaja Valencia when the group, to which he belonged, merged with Caja Madrid, because Olivas was convinced that his partner in the CP, had deceived him.
The complaint against exgestores FROB Banco de Valencia also includes Aurelio Left
The complaint against exgestores FROB Banco de Valencia also includes, as a possible beneficiary of the alleged offenses, Aurelio Izquierdo. Olivas right hand in Bancaja, Left relieved him as president of Banco de Valencia in October 2011, a position he held out a few weeks until it was taken over by the Bank of Spain.
Izquierdo, who Olivas recovered yet this spring as CFO of Bancaja, starred in a controversy a few weeks ago when it emerged that he was entitled to receive nearly 14 million euros of savings in compensation. Left has finally given up about half, and will receive 7.6 million euros.
0 件のコメント:
コメントを投稿