ロシア·ウクライナの紛争の経済的影響
OPINIÓN
Consecuencias económicas del conflicto Rusia-Ucrania
Guillermo de la Dehesa 4 ABR 2014 - 00:00 CET
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OPINION
Economic Consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict
Guillermo de la Dehesa 4 ABR 2014 - 00:00 CET
The extensive political debate on the conflict between Russia and Ukraine little mention its considerable economic consequences that affect both Ukraine , Russia and Europe.
First, Ukraine is in a very difficult economic situation and rescue cost much .
According to the IMF , its GDP has fallen back to 1.25% in 2013 , after several years of low growth (in 2009 fell by 14.9 %) and the average annual potential growth expected for 2013-2017 is 1 , 4%, 5.3 percentage points less than in the period 2003-2007.
In September 2013, its current external deficit reached 8.3% of GDP. Its foreign exchange reserves fell below 2.5 months of imports and external debt in 2014 will reach 86% of GDP , not counting that owes $ 3.000 billion ( EUR 2.189 million ) to Gazprom.
Europe depends on Russian energy : imported 32% of its gas production and 35% of oil
Their external financing needs ranging from 25,000 to 35,000 million , requiring a bailout to avoid bankruptcy. The IMF has announced aid of between 14,000 and 18,000 million.
In late 2013 the fiscal deficit ( state's Naftogaz ) was 7.75% of GDP.
Between 2012 and 2013 , wages rose by 17.5 % , the gas consumption subsidies , increased covering residential gas rates a small fraction of the cost , making the relative level of consumption is the highest in Europe.
For the EU will be expensive rescue Ukraine and will take years to introduce alternative supplies
In 2013 , after monetize its deficit, the money supply increased by 15.8% and the currency by 20%. Its expected inflation rate for 2014 will be 9.4% and the GDP deflator 13.8%. Finally , the interbank rate was 5.8 %, but credit to the private sector increased by 9.5%.
Second, Russia is heavily dependent on its sales of gas and oil to Europe .
About 50% of total budget revenues are generated by Russia 's total exports oil and gas to the world . Oil and gas now account for 70% of total exports , half of which goes to Europe .
Consequently , its national budget depends on the European market is the largest buyer of its energy exports. Besides gas , Russia exports to Europe six million daily barrels of crude oil and one million barrels of petroleum products.
According to the IMF (2013 ) , the price of oil and therefore the gas will undergo a gradual decline of nearly 20% between 2013 and 2018 , which will reduce their income and per capita income, closely correlated, given also that Russia is beginning to suffer a Dutch disease by excessive public investment in oil and gas that reduces private investment in other sectors , thus reducing its overall competitiveness.
Today , the output gap , ie the difference between actual growth rates and potential is practically zero , when operating close to full capacity production . This means you can not stimulate the economy because it would greatly increase the rate of inflation and because its core inflation and inflation equals its total , producing finally a devaluation of the exchange rate that would generate even more inflation.
Its economy has slowed rapidly following European , growing at 7 % in 2005-2008 to 4% between 2010 and 2012 to 1.3% in 2013 and 1.2 % in 2014. Finally, they have been increasing their capital outflows to Europe and have accelerated the crisis in Ukraine , which has decoupled the value of the ruble oil prices .
Third, Europe is very dependent on gas and oil from Russia, while importing almost more than a third of its total gas production ( 32%) and oil ( 35%). According to the International Energy Agency (IEA ) , the average dependence on oil and gas in the EU is 60% and may reach 80% in 2035.
In 2013 the total volume of gas imported from Russia reached 130,000 billion cubic meters ( bcm ) . In 2012 , total EU imports of oil and gas from all sources amounted to 400,000 million euros (3.1% of EU GDP ) when the average of the last twenty years was less than half that now .
European states with higher levels of dependence on gas are logically nearby or neighboring with Russia , and its dependence decreases as distance increases relative.
According to Morgan Stanley (2013 ) , the relative dependence on gas supplies from Gazprom , as a percentage of consumption is as follows : Finland , Belarus , Czech Republic and Bulgaria ( 100 % ), Serbia (95 % ), Latvia , Lithuania, Macedonia and Moldova (85 % ), Poland and Slovenia ( 80 %), Estonia ( 75 % ), Greece ( 70 %), Austria (68% ), Turkey ( 65 % ), Hungary ( 60%), Ukraine ( 55 %), Germany ( 48 % ), Italy ( 28%), France (19 %), Romania ( 18%), UK (15 % ), Switzerland ( 8%) and the Netherlands ( 5%).
Gazprom exports its gas to Europe through four pipelines : two northern Europe Nord Stream and Yamal ( 95 million m3 day) - through Germany and Poland, and two from the south through Ukraine ( 175 million m3 day).
Try to reduce this dependency now take a long time to have to increase both gas imports from Holland and Norway as those from North Africa and ultimately increasing the number of LNG facilities to bring gas from the U.S. and Eastern East. The EU has just consider a plan to be approved by mid-year , to reduce its dependence on Russian natural gas, but will only be applied to its Member States more dependent .
Later, the most reasonable alternative is gas from Algeria and Libya through Spain and Italy through two pipelines from Algeria ( Maghreb -Europe Gas Pipeline ) and from Libya ( Green Stream) .
Two from Algeria through Morocco and Spain , one large capacity from Beni Saf (Algeria ) to Almeria ( Medgas ) and another minor , from Hassi R'Mel (Morocco ) . Two others from Algeria to Italy via Sardinia : from The Haouaria to Mazara del Vallo and from Koudiet Draoucha to Piombino, and Libya to Italy , from Melita to Gela in Sicily.
The faster and cheaper alternative supplies would , in billion cubic meters, those from Norway ( 20 bcm ) and the Netherlands (20 bcm ) , and they are slower and expensive than would be the LNG Gazprom ( 30 bcm ) .
According to Georg Zachmann ( Brueguel 2014) , in 2012 , the total natural gas imported by the EU, Russia supplied one ( 23%) , followed by Norway ( 22%) , North Africa ( 10%) and LNG (liquefied natural gas ) (12 % ) , the remainder being domestic production ( 33%).
Finally , according to the Bank for International Settlements ( BIS), Basel (2013 ) , the exposure of EU banks to Russian banks reached 154.000 million, being the most exposed of France with 51,000 million , followed by Italy with 28,600 million, 23,700 million of Germany , the UK, with 19,000 million, 17,600 million with Holland and Sweden with 14,000 million.
In summary, the EU will be expensive rescue Ukraine, will be very expensive without Russian gas and also will take years to introduce alternative supplies except the Netherlands and Norway , and finally the banks EU have high asset position to Russia.
For all these reasons , it would continue to act forcefully in politics, but also with prudence in the economy.
Guillermo de la Dehesa is Chairman of the Centre for Economic Policy Research CEPR
ロシア·ウクライナの紛争の経済的影響
ギジェルモ·デ·ラデエサ4 ABR 2014 - 00:00 CET
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