スペイン政府は、国際通貨基金のスペインの信用金庫への警告を無視
España pidió al FMI en 2009 que no airease los problemas de la banca
El Fondo y el BCE advirtieron sobre la vulnerabilidad de las cajas de ahorros
El Gobierno reclamó a los técnicos que se centraran en las reformas estructurales
Sobre las entidades: “No vemos necesaria la intervención pública”
DESCARGABLE Las actas de la reunión de 11 de marzo de 2009
"Si cambiáramos la palabra España tendríamos el informe de Grecia"
In English: Spain asked IMF not to reveal troubles in banking sector in 2009
Amanda Mars Madrid 30 MAR 2014 - 00:00 CET
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Spain asked the IMF in 2009 that no airease banking problems
The Fund and the ECB warned about the vulnerability of savings
The Government claimed that the technicians to focus on structural reforms
About the entities: "We see public intervention necessary"
DOWNLOADABLE Minutes of the meeting of March 11, 2009
"If we change the word Spain Greece would report"
In Inglés: Spain IMF asked not to reveal troubles in banking industry in 2009
Amanda Mars Madrid 30 MAR 2014 - 00:00 CET
March 11, 2009 . They had fallen banks around the world: U.S., UK, Germany , France, Holland ... But not in Spain , Spain was genuine chest out a single formula that would save the world financial debacle : countercyclical provisions money that banks must reserve beyond the mandatory capital requirements to address rallies came delinquency if wrongly made . And yet , at the meeting of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF ) to analyze the evolution of the Spanish economy ( what is known as Article IV) held that day , it became clear that the alarms were being fired upon a system financial loaded brick in the real estate pinch . 18 days after this meeting , the Bank of Spain intervened Caja Castilla La Mancha (CCM).
At that appointment of two hours and 18 minutes, the executive director for Spain , Ramon Guzman asked technical mission that would not put the main focus on the weaknesses of the system , he complained of the hardness testing resistance that had undergone the sector and invited them to focus more on asking structural reforms , noting the weaknesses against the bench , as reflected in the minutes of that meeting declassified .
Spanish director criticized the harshness of endurance sector
"We have two concerns about political communication these stress tests " began Guzman, awaiting instructions to explain their authorities on the publication of these results " due to its sensitive nature and its implications for the extreme market volatility at this stage. " "I hope that the Council understands this common sense of prudence ," he added . He had qualified exams "extreme" , " unrealistic " and based on " technically debatable assumptions ." Guzman continued, " More importantly, and technicians have been balanced submitted its findings and directors have been balanced in its written - person statements less informed and the press can interpret IMF advice to the authorities as if they were focused solely on keeping that ammunition reserve for capital injections into the banking system , "which he said in Spanish, " would really be a shame . "
"From the point of view of my authorities , that the board is less valuable than two capitals tips highlighted in the report of the inspectors. The pressure that the IMF can bring to power , and technicians are well aware of this, the fiscal front in the political debate and to accelerate structural reforms is much more valuable to us than the call for prudence in the banking front " stressed the Spanish representative.
The head for Spain , Bob Traa , economist had used the term " powder dry " in its Article IV , referring to ammunition safe from moisture and therefore usable , to make use of it if at a critical time necessary , which in Spain could be used as backup or gunpowder bullet in the chamber .
The Fund advised to have " ammunition reservation" if the crisis was complicated
" We encourage the authorities to conserve ammunition reserves to deal with any requests for additional public equity support to banks " , but then I saw no need . I had to return to this point by noting that if the crisis is prolonged and dynamic provisioning ceased to apply , " the system could experience significant stress." "This is the spirit in which we present the argument that fiscal policy should await some ammunition in reserve."
Although not primed , the IMF report made public shortly after these warnings kept ammunition reserve and the Council, in the letter made public , warned of the vulnerability of savings .
In October, the government had already announced extraordinary measures to solve the liquidity problems of the banks, which had been financed by foreign credit and was beginning to suffer the hardships and rising delinquencies . In October 2008 , five months before the meeting of the IMF, announced a fund of 50,000 million to support the sector rose to 100,000 euros per person and entities guaranteeing deposits . Delinquencies close to 5 % this summer, the highest level the last 13 years , then. "The problem is that banks do not rely on each other , but not themselves ," he said at that time the governor of the Bank of Spain , Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez.
Neither the IMF showed great confidence. Among the questions of CEOs , Korean Hi- Su Lee warned in his statement that " stress tests suggest a possible technical need for additional capital ," so stressed that " the capital injection should be ensured " . M. Inés Agudelo also asked " whether the risks generated by the boxes could be systemic ."
The representative of the European Central Bank ( ECB) , Georges Pineau , argued that the Spanish authorities " deserve credit " because a frame was then considered prudent and had allowed the banks to weather well the financial storm , but warned that henceforth " there could be more pressure," and recalled that 60 % of bank credit was for the real estate sector a world full of problems. " The uncertainty surrounding the boxes because their exposure to the sector is considerable," he said. The Spanish representative would calm down. "At present the banking sector is dealing with the crisis. The authorities are far more concerned about the economic downturn and rising unemployment in general , and the fall in house , specifically " prices.
That first budget announced by the Spanish government in October support months later became the so-called bailout fund , the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB ) , who was born 9.000 million, but with theoretical ability to borrow in the markets to almost 100,000 million , a capability that could not be used when needed .
CCM fell a few days after the meeting of the Fund. Ramon Guzman had left a disturbing phrase about March 11 : " There is no way that private capital can enter directly into the boxes, because of its quasi-public nature. This explains the intervention model , "he said , riveting : " The authorities let them reach a point of no return , allowing them to break and then forcing its absorption by another box. "
2009 marked the beginning of the great crisis of the Spanish banking for which Spain had no such reserve ammunition . Three years later, eventually asking the government to rescue their community partners to recapitalize much of its financial sector.
"We see public intervention necessary "
The Government did not provide " public interventions to address solvency problems " 18 days before the intervention of Caja Castilla La Mancha (CCM). So said Ramon Guzman at the meeting of the IMF governing board . When he explained using some boxes had made public guarantees Executive , said: " Some banks have also used government guarantees to issue new debt in the amount of 5,500 million euros. The initial amount approved for this support line (100,000 million) probably will not be fully used in 2009. "
According to Guzman , the IMF report duly emphasized " that the Spanish authorities are ready to provide capital support to banks in case you need it ." However, " while some consolidation may help some of the smaller and weaker to shelter from the storm entities not currently considered necessary for public interventions to address the storm."
If the meeting with the Fund was held on 11 March , 29 , came what was to be the first operation of a savings bank in the financial crisis and the Government approved a guarantee of 9.0000 million to the liquidity problems of entity until that day presided by Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto . The box had been losing deposits and the failure of the merger with Unicaja Friday prior intervention triggered the reaction of the Bank of Spain .
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