キプロス金融危機の後遺症からの、欧州銀行統合の必要性の実行、実施
ANÁLISIS
‘Match ball’ con secuelas
'El culpable debe pagar', por XAVIER VIDAL-FOLCH
'Chipre y el fantasma islandés', por J. CARLOS DÍEZ
Santiago Carbó 26 MAR 2013 - 01:57 CET
ANALYSIS
'Match Ball' with sequelae
'The guilty must pay', by Xavier Vidal-Folch
'Cyprus and the Icelandic ghost', by J. Carlos Diez
Santiago Carbo 26 MAR 2013 - 01:57 CET
The evaluation of the new rescue in extremis to Cyprus goes not only for the possible implications of this agreement, but the aftermath leaves rescue that first decision, hasty, little thoughtful and harmful. The deal on the table is a new match ball to save the eurozone but leaves doubts, many aspects of which resolution and impact remain uncertain. Among others, such instructive and leave absolutely inappropriate for the President of the Eurogroup dropped yesterday suggesting just the opposite to what we have said in recent days: that the mechanism for Cyprus can be extrapolated to other cases.
In this new agreement and not taxed deposits "insured", those of less than 100,000 euros. Now he wishes to reaffirm that are protected throughout the eurozone. The new bailout formula also prevents the imposition of a tax on foreign bank depositors operating in Cyprus. And correction mechanisms of losses will be centered in the Cypriot financial institutions were on the verge of bankruptcy: Bank of Cyprus and Laiki. Be uninsured depositors (accounts above 100,000 euros) of Laiki most affected. This bank will restructure by dividing it into a bad bank, where, among other things, spend their uninsured deposits-and a good bank, which adheres to the Bank of Cyprus.
The bad bank will impose losses of Laiki shareholders and bondholders, but not bring them a lot of resources, but it is important to maintain the order of losses. Also, sell assets and losses such shares outstanding after the offset with uninsured deposits. For the Bank of Cyprus, the holders of its unsecured accounts will see part of them become that bank shares, with considerable remove. Depositor to shareholders in an involuntary jump.
There remain some important fringe to close, which is partly the legacy of the error of the first bailout bill. It seems that restrictions on access to accounts for deposits of less than 100,000 euros will be removed soon. It is difficult to predict which customers will then savings and if try to mobilize quickly, which could force the Cypriot authorities to establish new restrictions on deposits. It seems also to be established capital outflow controls durable uninsured depositors. This can also be a bad precedent. International investors might think that controlling capital outflows is a new standard mechanism in the eurozone could become a practice extended to other European countries, because in the past there have been outflows important deposits in some of them.
The EU wants to impose a restructuring plan to Cyprus to create a new banking model, less like a haven for foreign fortunes, they had, in many cases, the shadow of money laundering. However, without this type of banking, the Cypriot economy will suffer. Also, capital controls will very significantly reduce the liquidity of the country and a very important ballast growth.
The Cypriot case evidence that imbalances in the banking structures of some financial systems are one of the best excuses for those who have no interest in speeding up the European banking union. However, this integration seems the only solution for Europe today. The solution to Cyprus wills little evidence in that direction. How many match ball will be needed to advance?
Santiago Carbo Valverde is Professor of Economics and Finance, Bangor Business School (UK) and researcher Funcas.
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