スペイン国立銀行の監督局長は、CAJA MADRIDに不動産の貸し付け融資の危険性を警告していたのに、CAJA Madrid総裁のMIGUEL BLESAは、その手紙を取締役会で公表しなかった
“El riesgo con promotores inmobiliarios crece un 55%. Dé cuenta al consejo”
El Banco de España envió una carta de advertencia a Caja Madrid en 2006 y Blesa dice que transmitió el aviso
Francisco Mercado Madrid 15 OCT 2012 - 00:00 CET
"The risk with real estate grew 55%. Debrief the advice "
The Bank of Spain sent a warning letter to Caja Madrid in 2006 and aired Blesa said notice
Francisco Mercado Madrid 15 OCT 2012 - 00:00 CET
On 29 December 2006, the director general of the Bank of Spain Oversight sent a letter, previously approved by the executive committee of the supervisory body, the president of Caja Madrid, Miguel Blesa. In the letter, whose entry into Caja Madrid was registered on January 3, 2007, warning of rising credit risks observed with the entity linked to the property sector, and ordered to be given "full consideration" of the warnings and recommendations all members of the Management Board and the Supervisory Board of Caja Madrid. However, half dozen former directors of the box (representing unions and political parties) have assured this newspaper that never got written warning that anyone nor read it on a board. The president of the organization at the time, Miguel Blesa, but admits that he handed the letter to directors denies and says that if you read them.
The writing of the Bank of Spain, headed by Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez, appointed by the Socialist government five months earlier, was particularly blunt in his statement to Blesa: "The risk to this sector [developer] continues to grow very significantly higher than it does to the rest of the chapters in lending. For example, in March 2006 with promoters willing risk grew by 55% year on year while the overall lending did 27% and represented 13% of the total risk of the entity, which guarantees and available would rise to 17%. "
Caja Madrid: "downward solvency, improved governance"
The 2006 inspection of the Bank of Spain that led to the letter of reproach to Caja Madrid and recommendations to the entity defined as a box with "an acceptable credit, but down in the last year" and an "improved governance" . As watchpoints, and the worsening of the risk profile of the mortgage portfolio, the supervisor pointed to "increased market risk arising from the investment strategy in listed investments and the increasing reliance on wholesale market issues to finance their lending, with a weight exceeding his rank institutions and the industry average, "according to the report said.
"Regular reporting to the board could be improved if it focused towards a more direct assessment of the risk assumed," he added. Y predicted the future: "This structure does not care so much from a liquidity standpoint, but in terms of future impacts Net interest income, on stages rising cost of new issues to renew the current. "
Research
2006 saw "risk trade policies" in the entity
The Bank of Spain looming danger with facts. He said back in 2006 that was in Caja Madrid a "strong credit growth above average" in both commercial banking, mortgages (up 35%) and promoter (37.6% more), as in corporate banking ( 31%), "with significant weight secured loans, 65% of the total, mainly mortgages, 54%, up from 41.4% in the comparison group."
The brick was the seed of the future collapse of the entity. "The mortgage portfolio acquired in the last three years a high risk profile for the brunt of operations with LTV [percentage of financing the purchase of the house] over 80%, increased depreciation system in geometric progression and client abroad (...) the main credit risk, reporting the property cycle, with a rising market risk by acquiring strategic stakes and increasing financial corporations. "
Warning Letter Bank of Spain in 2006 to Caja Madrid
Liquidity lived as "a growing dependence of these institutional markets to finance growth." And, again, read the future: "In the event of a liquidity crisis scenarios of institutional markets could lead to a rise in the cost of renovation of current emissions, the impact on profitability." Therefore called for "a greater involvement of internal audit in the review of liquidity risk."
The banking supervisor recalled in the letter that it was the first notice to the entity offering. "It reiterates the reflection on risk promoter was done in the previous letter of recommendations dated December 22, 2004, in the sense of the need to control rigorously promoter activity, as it involves a high level of risk, especially if borrowers are not providing funds proportionate to the magnitude of the project and the credit recovery expectations rest on a hypothetical future price developments. "
Inspection of the Bank of Spain, 2009 confirmed that the notices of 2004 and 2006 had already become a serious problem that weighed down the accounts of Caja Madrid. As stated in these investigations later, "a December 31, 2008, the promotion risk provisions amounted to 22.915 million euros, representing 18.4% of total credit risk. The NPL ratio stood at 10.92% delinquency compared to 5.5% overall entity (...) Caja Madrid has no policy on asset acquisition promoters, performing ad hoc actions. These acquisitions are reaching very significant figures, outstripping forecasts, constituting a headlong rush policy to provide provisional feasibility to borrowers affected, "he revealed.
The 2006 survey also warned of other risks that would later echo in the future also. "Can mention certain trade policies that increase the risk profile of the portfolio, as the generalization of loans whose amount exceeds 80% of the appraised value of the mortgaged property, which accounted for 36% of the current risk or extension of deadlines repayment, "he noted. The tone was not as alarming as in 2009 and 2010, but warned of a situation that, years later, would cause the collapse.
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