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COLUMNA
Alemania a la defensiva
Merkel intenta desandar el camino tras el acuerdo del pasado junio sobre la recapitalización bancaria
José Ignacio Torreblanca 18 OCT 2012 - 18:45 CET
COLUMN
Germany on the defensive
Merkel tries to retrace his steps after the agreement last June on bank recapitalization
José Ignacio Torreblanca 18 OCT 2012 - 18:45 CET
As Tom Thumb, Merkel made the text of the agreement last June on bank recapitalization crumbs littered let him go home. Recapitalization would, yes, but only when there was an effective monitoring mechanism at European level, a formal decision of the rescue fund (the ESM, Eurogroup agreement and a memorandum of understanding setting a strict compliance with the State. This has allowed, over recent months, should collect all those crumbs and try to retrace your steps. First tried to exclude banks whose problems were prior to the adoption of this decision. then wanted to exclude banks and credit institutions medium and small, who are the ones most problems. later tried to postpone the entry into force of the agreement until 2014 and, finally, has begun to filter the idea that the mechanism is illegal within the existing treaties. This German attitude is certainly irritating, yes, but hides good news: that after the arrival of Hollande and the combined action of France, Spain and Italy, Germany is losing the initiative. Added to the drubbing that the IMF has dealt this week to policies extreme austerity, Germany is not only defensive, but increasingly isolated.
When the European Council last June 29, the combined pressure of Hollande, Monti and Rajoy became irresistible, Merkel agreed to direct recapitalization of banks (Spanish or otherwise) under the European bailout mechanisms (EFSF or ESM) . It was a crucial victory, not only because it would suit Spain, which otherwise would have to spend 40,000 million aid to banks for their budgets, further deteriorating the rating and debt sustainability, but it laid the foundations for the establishment of a banking union, ie an integrated oversight, management and bank resolution at European level. That announcement, along with the ECB's decision to approve a program of bond purchases in the secondary market, gave a complete reversal of the euro crisis. Until then, European leaders had insisted time and again that they would spare no effort or resources to prevent the euro would break, but had not done enough to be credible to the markets, from now on it was clear that the euro not only had the political will, but the financial resources to make that promise credible.
Treason! Protested in Germany and some other capitals, noting that Merkel had been a victim of money hungry wolves cool with which to finance their debts and, at par, the ECB would have succumbed to the pressures of national central banks, which also behave like a pack of wolves, the Bundesbank would have been isolated. So, where some saw an act of leadership that would save the euro, others saw an act of weakness that would lead to Germany's worst and most feared scenario: a "transfer union" in which, via a double pincer, vicious countries to transfer the debts of their banks and United virtuous countries and in return, the virtuous transfer their savings to the vicious.
But the reality is different. If Merkel agreed to double this agreement was not because three schoolyard bullies the cornered. If the deal is imposed because Spain, France and Italy were able to establish a general principle that would inspire all subsequent decisions, "the need [imperative, emphasizes the text of the agreement] to break the vicious circle between banks and states", a must for that the euro can survive. This is an essential principle, as a federation foreshadows economic: as in the United States, the State of California is broke, but not transferred their problems to the financial sector or a bank failure does not cause a bankruptcy of a State, the European Union need firewalls to prevent contagion between banks and states, which can only be achieved Europeanizing oversight mechanisms and debt management, public and private. That it has taken so long to make a decision as seemingly common sense is no accident. In the European Union, a principle is the most powerful negotiating tool, the most effective lever to trigger changes that open the way to new policies. We finally have one that is favorable to both our interests as Spanish and as Europeans. Just need to apply.
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