欧州連合の財政赤字削減のための緊縮財政は、失業増大、経済後退、政府歳入の減少をもたらし、財政赤字削減のための経済成長にはほど遠い。
OPINIÓN
¿Rescatan los rescates?
Xavier Vidal-Folch 15 NOV 2012 - 18:21 CET
OPINION
Rescued? Bailouts?
Xavier Vidal-Folch 15 NOV 2012 - 18:21 CET
There was rarely so clear inner abyss. The Spanish financial world, many large companies, and the bulk of the academy (see the debate in the forum of www.europeg.com) urgently asked the rescue to eliminate uncertainties. The road curling only hear that word, because it related to new settings and unfair cuts against (former) welfare always. And amid the government to come unscathed bracea year end and then see what happens.
So take advantage of the current intermission to ask: Rescued rescue troubled countries with the European counterpart of severe austerity programs?
So far, no. Neither Greece (May 2, 2010), and Ireland (November 28) and Portugal (16 May 2011) achieve the key objective of the rescue: consolidate their public finances, reducing the government deficit-to a certain level within default, in the path of 3%. Portugal still not meet the 4.5% deficit this year, but it could be almost 6%, and this year we have extended the deadline. Greece does not reach 4.5%, but 5.2% in 2013: the next meeting of the Eurogroup will grant an additional two years. And for Ireland is being revised to soften the brutal impact of the cost of bank restructuring, equivalent to 45%! of GDP.
The adjustments fail to reduce the deficit in the schedule, but achieve certain results
Not only did not reduce the deficit in the prescribed, but aggravated the recession (except in Ireland, which in 2011 was recovered, but we'll see what happens this year), increased its debt and unemployment soared. And abruptly and simultaneously reduced many social benefits of the welfare state. The daily reports Lisbon, Athens and Brussels excuse details.
The reason for the fiasco is the cruelty that designed the first generation of bailouts (interest rates on loans, excessive; repayment, scarce). Accompanied blind optimism which provided little damage on the growth of spending cuts.
And yet, it is fair to underline what is forgotten. Not every effort has been buried in the sump. He has produced some results. What?
For example, the rescued have recovered, and weakly intermittent, some access to the international market for financing. Portugal issued ten-year bonds on August 21 at 9.254%: a guy too, yes, but less than 17.39% of the eve of the rescue. Greece three-month bills issued on September 18, at 4.31%. Ireland, as well, on 5 July, to 1.8% (half a point less than Spain the previous week). And Irish bonds fell to nine years six points from October 2010 to last September.
The most heroic was the Greek primary deficit reduction: about eight points since the crisis began, to skirt the surplus. Which means that if the Greeks did not have to shoulder one's debt, would fulfill its commitments to spare.
A very interesting is the head of the European bailout fund (EFSF, for its acronym in English), Klaus Regling. It is an official source course-interested-but solid. In some interesting graphs presented at the conference of Cernobbio, Regling illustrated how the five peripheral eurozone countries undergoing turbulence (the three rescued, plus Spain and Italy) curves exhibit positive in four basic criteria.
Namely: the budget shortfall, the cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit, the current account balance and unit labor costs. As four images are worth more than 400 words, I invite you to navigate to find Europe's response to the sovereign debt crisis (www.oenb.at).
Of course that's not enough, especially when contrasted with the bill and cleft social democratic policies of the current setting. But if you throw some positive results, albeit scattered and asthma, it means that a different form, a different calendar, an injection of compensatory resources that stimulated demand, things would be much better. That is, a policy of frugality and attentive moderate growth fails perhaps succeed where extreme austerity.
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