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欧州中央銀行は、スペイン国債とイタリア国債の市場での異常高金利を解消するために、何をするのか?
¿Qué se guarda Draghi en la chistera?
El Banco Central Europeo baraja múltiples acciones para relajar las presiones de los mercados
Claudi Pérez Bruselas26 JUL 2012 - 20:16 CET
What is saved in the hat Draghi?
The European Central Bank shuffles multiple actions to ease market pressures
Claudi Perez Brussels 26 JUL 2012 - 20:16 CET
The European Central Bank shuffles multiple actions to ease market pressures
Claudi Perez Brussels 26 JUL 2012 - 20:16 CET
Not only share their location in Frankfurt, the ECB inherited from the Bundesbank's ban on buying government debt at the time of issue and to rescue needy States. The European treaties do not explicitly rule out purchases of debt issued and the second hand market, but that is at odds with the philosophy which presided over the creation of the euro. Still, the ECB bought Greek and Portuguese bonds in the spring of 2010, and again Italian and Spanish bonds in the summer and autumn of 2011. But with the small mouth. In small amounts. And so convoluted arguments that everyone felt the discomfort of Eurobanco, forced to confront the reluctance of several countries, led by Germany (whose directors, hawks Axel Weber and Juergen Stark, eventually resigning and criticized the ECB for excessive risk taking and consider such interventions disguised transfers).
It is unlikely that the ECB will re-open its bond purchase program because, in addition, monetary policy experts believe that a country that enjoys the generosity of the central bank may be tempted to abuse it: Berlusconi's Italy withdrew much of of planned cuts when he saw the ECB opened fire. For all that it is likely that the ECB will shake hands with the purchase of bonds, unlike those who have made the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve. However, in the toolbox there are multiple options to ease market pressures (each more convoluted, with the maze of acronyms and language that characterizes Eurobanco impossible).
It is unlikely that the ECB will re-open its bond purchase program
The relations between the ECB and the strongest countries in Europe seem at this time a strategy game: at stake is the credibility of Eurobanco, but also the future of the euro. Nothing is free, every movement is accompanied by outstanding ECB of tough demands. Here are the main options available to the Draghi to ensure that their statements that - "believe me: it is enough" - are, unlike what usually happens in Brussels, more than words.
■ Interest rates. The ECB left the official price of money in July to a record low, 0.75%. There is room in UK, Japan and the U.S. have even lower rates. Several members of the governing council have ensured that there could be another cut if the situation deteriorates. But the directory is skeptical about the effectiveness of this measure could have. It could also cause difficulties for weaker banks, which would be further weakened margins. Beyond the rate cuts, the central bank can signal to markets that will keep them low while the problems continue, as has the U.S. Federal Reserve. That has a major problem in the European case: the long-term rates (government bond, for example) in the north are down. In the south, are very high.
more informationDraghi says the ECB is "ready for anything" to save the euroThe Exchange recorded its biggest rise in two years after the strong improvement in debtThe IMF says Europe has room to take further measures against the crisisThe European Central Bank studied relief for Spain and ItalyBelgian Foreign Minister: "Spain should get more help"
■ Cuts in the type of deposit. The European banking swims in a sea of liquidity from auctions in late 2011 and early 2012: the problem is that much of this liquidity back to the ECB by the prevailing distrust. Banks hold the money in a deposit at the ECB. Cutting the rates paid by the ECB (even negative rates) would be for banks even less profitable and would increase their appetite for risk. You can even pay them back.
■ long-term auctions. The ECB surprised with two auctions to three years, amounting to one billion euros that created an oasis of calm that lasted at least a couple of quarters. However, neither the banks have returned to lend or that tranquility here to stay. A new auction is at least "questionable," said Dirk Schumacher in a recent analysis by Goldman Sachs. "The size and complexity of the two auctions are such that it can not be expected to have immediate effects," he assured himself Draghi. However, it could be an option for a little more to encourage banks to buy debt peripheral.
■ Collateral. The most likely is the possibility of relaxing the guarantees demanded by the ECB for banks to go to your window, something that has already done it before, or even minor cuts apply: with the same asset more cash. The ECB does not give away the money to the banks: it provides, and in return allow entities assets as collateral, as public debt. There is talk of suspending the need for assets carried on the ECB have discounted rating. Eligible assets amounted to 9.5 billion euros in 2007 are now 14 billion, a real ocean of liquidity, according to Goldman Sachs.
■ reserve ratio. The ECB lowered at the end of last year required minimum reserves of 2% to 1%. A further cut would give more leeway to banks.
■ Purchases of assets. The crux of the matter. In May 2009 the ECB announced a purchase of covered bonds (covered bonds and the like in the Spanish case) of 60.000 million. In November 2011, 40.000 million more. To this we must add the program spent in the purchase of public debt: total, 280,000 million. A pittance in relation to what central banks have spent much more active, as the U.S. Fed. With the exception of the purchase of bonds on the Treasuries auctions in Europe, the ECB may revive asset purchases: firepower is estimated at two billion euros, double the wealth produced by Spain in one year . But experts consider it unlikely that reactive Draghi purchases of government debt, at least without strict compliance ensured, says Mujtaba Rahman, the think tank Eurasia. "The obstacles to the purchase of bonds are very high," Schumacher abounds: Eurobanco himself distrusts the effectiveness of this measure for Spain and Italy, the investors are gone never to return for a while if there is a radical. This radical change can come from two sources: an improbable, is that the ECB set thresholds for the risk premium (which would be a kind of anathema in Germany). The other is to bypass the reluctance of the countries hardest with the purchase of a basket of bonds. An ECB more American. Yesterday's words leave open that possibility. But analysts consider it remotely.
■ Support the bailout funds. The firepower of the temporary bailout fund (EFSF) and permanent mechanism (Mede) is limited, around 500,000 million. The ability to give these jackets a bank card would significantly expand its power as the governor said on Wednesday the Bank of Austria. That way there would be the ECB who played his prestige. Although experts have doubts about the legality of that option, the sources in Brussels now considered the most viable option: purchase of bonds by the temporary rescue fund in Treasury auctions, once the mechanism is ready permanent, that is the one who fired, and if there is political agreement to extend the power of fire with a banking license in a kind of nuclear threat to scare off speculators. But even the opposite option is ruled out: that the bailout fund endorse any losses for the ECB to buy debt without risk of damaging your balance, which makes for example the British Treasury with the Bank of England.
It is unlikely that the ECB will re-open its bond purchase program because, in addition, monetary policy experts believe that a country that enjoys the generosity of the central bank may be tempted to abuse it: Berlusconi's Italy withdrew much of of planned cuts when he saw the ECB opened fire. For all that it is likely that the ECB will shake hands with the purchase of bonds, unlike those who have made the Bank of England and the U.S. Federal Reserve. However, in the toolbox there are multiple options to ease market pressures (each more convoluted, with the maze of acronyms and language that characterizes Eurobanco impossible).
It is unlikely that the ECB will re-open its bond purchase program
The relations between the ECB and the strongest countries in Europe seem at this time a strategy game: at stake is the credibility of Eurobanco, but also the future of the euro. Nothing is free, every movement is accompanied by outstanding ECB of tough demands. Here are the main options available to the Draghi to ensure that their statements that - "believe me: it is enough" - are, unlike what usually happens in Brussels, more than words.
■ Interest rates. The ECB left the official price of money in July to a record low, 0.75%. There is room in UK, Japan and the U.S. have even lower rates. Several members of the governing council have ensured that there could be another cut if the situation deteriorates. But the directory is skeptical about the effectiveness of this measure could have. It could also cause difficulties for weaker banks, which would be further weakened margins. Beyond the rate cuts, the central bank can signal to markets that will keep them low while the problems continue, as has the U.S. Federal Reserve. That has a major problem in the European case: the long-term rates (government bond, for example) in the north are down. In the south, are very high.
more informationDraghi says the ECB is "ready for anything" to save the euroThe Exchange recorded its biggest rise in two years after the strong improvement in debtThe IMF says Europe has room to take further measures against the crisisThe European Central Bank studied relief for Spain and ItalyBelgian Foreign Minister: "Spain should get more help"
■ Cuts in the type of deposit. The European banking swims in a sea of liquidity from auctions in late 2011 and early 2012: the problem is that much of this liquidity back to the ECB by the prevailing distrust. Banks hold the money in a deposit at the ECB. Cutting the rates paid by the ECB (even negative rates) would be for banks even less profitable and would increase their appetite for risk. You can even pay them back.
■ long-term auctions. The ECB surprised with two auctions to three years, amounting to one billion euros that created an oasis of calm that lasted at least a couple of quarters. However, neither the banks have returned to lend or that tranquility here to stay. A new auction is at least "questionable," said Dirk Schumacher in a recent analysis by Goldman Sachs. "The size and complexity of the two auctions are such that it can not be expected to have immediate effects," he assured himself Draghi. However, it could be an option for a little more to encourage banks to buy debt peripheral.
■ Collateral. The most likely is the possibility of relaxing the guarantees demanded by the ECB for banks to go to your window, something that has already done it before, or even minor cuts apply: with the same asset more cash. The ECB does not give away the money to the banks: it provides, and in return allow entities assets as collateral, as public debt. There is talk of suspending the need for assets carried on the ECB have discounted rating. Eligible assets amounted to 9.5 billion euros in 2007 are now 14 billion, a real ocean of liquidity, according to Goldman Sachs.
■ reserve ratio. The ECB lowered at the end of last year required minimum reserves of 2% to 1%. A further cut would give more leeway to banks.
■ Purchases of assets. The crux of the matter. In May 2009 the ECB announced a purchase of covered bonds (covered bonds and the like in the Spanish case) of 60.000 million. In November 2011, 40.000 million more. To this we must add the program spent in the purchase of public debt: total, 280,000 million. A pittance in relation to what central banks have spent much more active, as the U.S. Fed. With the exception of the purchase of bonds on the Treasuries auctions in Europe, the ECB may revive asset purchases: firepower is estimated at two billion euros, double the wealth produced by Spain in one year . But experts consider it unlikely that reactive Draghi purchases of government debt, at least without strict compliance ensured, says Mujtaba Rahman, the think tank Eurasia. "The obstacles to the purchase of bonds are very high," Schumacher abounds: Eurobanco himself distrusts the effectiveness of this measure for Spain and Italy, the investors are gone never to return for a while if there is a radical. This radical change can come from two sources: an improbable, is that the ECB set thresholds for the risk premium (which would be a kind of anathema in Germany). The other is to bypass the reluctance of the countries hardest with the purchase of a basket of bonds. An ECB more American. Yesterday's words leave open that possibility. But analysts consider it remotely.
■ Support the bailout funds. The firepower of the temporary bailout fund (EFSF) and permanent mechanism (Mede) is limited, around 500,000 million. The ability to give these jackets a bank card would significantly expand its power as the governor said on Wednesday the Bank of Austria. That way there would be the ECB who played his prestige. Although experts have doubts about the legality of that option, the sources in Brussels now considered the most viable option: purchase of bonds by the temporary rescue fund in Treasury auctions, once the mechanism is ready permanent, that is the one who fired, and if there is political agreement to extend the power of fire with a banking license in a kind of nuclear threat to scare off speculators. But even the opposite option is ruled out: that the bailout fund endorse any losses for the ECB to buy debt without risk of damaging your balance, which makes for example the British Treasury with the Bank of England.
帽子ドラギに何が保存されている?
欧州中央銀行は市場の圧力を容易にするために複数のアクションをシャッフル
Claudiペレスブリュッセル26 JUL 2012 - 午後八時16分CET
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