ユーロを守るための欧州連合
Una gran coalición para defender el euro
La intervención acabará con el despilfarro público, pero certifica el fracaso de las políticas del Gobierno
A broad coalition to defend the euro
The intervention will end the wasteful public, but certifies the failure of government policies
Manuel Sanchis 30 JUL 2012 - 00:05 CET
The intervention will end the wasteful public, but certifies the failure of government policies
Manuel Sanchis 30 JUL 2012 - 00:05 CET
The Eurogroup adopted on July 20 the granting of a loan from the EFSM (European Financial Stability Mechanism) the FROB (Bank Restructuring Fund) amounting to 100,000 million euros for this, in turn, inject capital into banks with impaired assets. This is not an unconditional bailout, nor is it the first time a Spanish Government seeks outside help to solve the problems of home, but from the Stabilization Plan (1959) did not tell us how we had to govern.
Between that and this setting there are enormous differences, then suffered the dictatorship, today enjoyed a democratic system, although of poor quality before economic policy tools was more autonomous and could devalue the peseta, but now we are forced to do all the internal adjustment , which depresses the economy, pushing up the risk premium, and hinders our recovery. The intervention will end the wasteful public, but certifies the failure of government policies. The conditions of the bailout, roughly coincide with those raised in 2008 in this same paper, but on reaching almost four years later, require additional measures. It would therefore be desirable to move towards a grand coalition to assume the defense of the euro.
The Spanish economy needs structural reforms and adjustments, but there are many ways to apply according to deadlines and the distribution of the load. Much or more than the size of the interest adjustment quality. We need the adjustment is fair and not dismantle the welfare state, if we still believe that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice). We must not abandon the welfare state because we can not finance it: we can reduce its size and adapt to what we are able to afford, but the principle is absolute. Although now we are poor, we must not be less fair. Government reforms, however, are strongly ideologized and inspired by the anarchic libertarianism. This applies to labor reform, which seeks flexibility vulgar, but barely scratches the active policies of the labor market, that strengthen the employability or work-life balance policies, which are attributes of flexicurity in force in those EU countries that exhibit the lowest unemployment rates. This ideology is reflected in the tax amnesty and increased VAT What moral force urges efforts the Government employees, the unemployed, and tax payers when the fraudster or amnesty allows banks to act irresponsibly knowing the government, eventually, redeem them?
The Government can not hide behind the need for adjustment, but start with the institutions of exemplary conduct as "Throne and Altar" property tax levy to the Church and reduce the costs of the Royal House. The remuneration and annuities of our politicians should keep pace with the reduction of 30% set by Hollande pay for his government and the French political class. Mr. Rajoy, orderly liquidate nonviable banks, because if you want your benefits are morally justified, must be able to be liquidated or break any company. Banks pass the crisis expected to sell at exorbitant prices which financed speculation, but they were wrong, and now unwilling to take the costs of mismanagement. Go then to collect taxes from multinationals and large Spanish companies, and at the time, with the credibility and moral authority won, go to taxpayers, unions and employers and reclámeles the sacrifices necessary to reconcile the public finances that the powerful were responsible for being wasteful. In politics as in economics, always choose the lesser evil, but the order of actions does alter the product.
What pushes the risk premium is the situation in Spain, but also the design of the euro cojitranco
To work properly the euro governments must respect the rule of thumb: the adjustment begins at home. This means correct the excess savings in some economies, and in others, such as Spanish, excessive spending that has led to an unsustainable level of indebtedness of the private sector, especially business and financial institutions. The public deficit, in itself, is not a serious economic problem, nor the level of debt, if we own currency, but the mismanagement of public spending yes it is, as violating the commitments of financial stability which Spain pledged to sign the Stability and Growth Pact. The crux of the problem, however, is not the deficit but the private sector.
There is no guarantee that we can pay the mortgage of up to 100,000 million, or we can save the 65,000 million from the cuts, but credit to the FROB computed as debt rather than deficit, unlike Ireland, ease credit conditions, and pressure to reduce public spending. It would also help an additional smoothing, the third in the timing of deficit targets, but not immunize us against the full redemption. The recent adjustments which will arrive in summer will be unable to lower the risk premium. In addition, a further reduction of the note of Spain for the agency said Ficht, now two steps of junk bond, reduce the capacity of the Treasury for funding.
To operate the common currency must respect the golden rule: the adjustment begins at home
Some of the pressure on the risk premium is the result of poor macroeconomic management of the Spanish governments, but that pressure subsist because they are the same cuts that generate uncertainty about the resilience of business and collection efficiency of the measures the Government. What pushes the risk premium is, above all, the plight of Spain, but also the design of the euro cojitranco which risks it explodes and disappears. This is the result of German stubbornness in refusing to do their share of adjustment, not to mobilize their excess savings and expand their labor costs and prices, which would help sidestep a recession in Germany, and the rebalancing of the peripherals. The Germans tightened more than necessary and must now carry out an internal revaluation so not to fall into deflation peripherals. Furthermore, the ECB's refusal to generate more inflation and debt purchase in the secondary market more cuts sentence to the periphery. The ECB has an obligation to defend price stability, but also the euro. We therefore hope that Rajoy, as did Monti, Merkel display with the same determination that the adjustments applied to Chancellor trigger an internal reassessment and persuade Germany, incognito, to the ECB to buy debt.
As in the prisoner's dilemma, this is a game of many players with non-cooperative strategies. While it is difficult to estimate how our economy can withstand financed at rates as the current punitive before collapsing. If they were two or three months the situation would claim a government of national concentration, unless, as in the prisoner's dilemma, before we launch a credible threat of leaving the euro to wake from his reverie Merkel national and confronted with the need for a European solution to the crisis, rather than leaving an inheritance a downgrade of German debt, and an area frame as reminiscent of the current eurozone. Not the first time a monetary union were to fail in Europe, but, as in the game of marbles, the fun ends when the one that won all the marbles do not put back in motion.
Manuel Sanchis i Marco is a professor of applied economics at the University of Valencia and Research Associate AQR-IREA at the University of Barcelona.
Between that and this setting there are enormous differences, then suffered the dictatorship, today enjoyed a democratic system, although of poor quality before economic policy tools was more autonomous and could devalue the peseta, but now we are forced to do all the internal adjustment , which depresses the economy, pushing up the risk premium, and hinders our recovery. The intervention will end the wasteful public, but certifies the failure of government policies. The conditions of the bailout, roughly coincide with those raised in 2008 in this same paper, but on reaching almost four years later, require additional measures. It would therefore be desirable to move towards a grand coalition to assume the defense of the euro.
The Spanish economy needs structural reforms and adjustments, but there are many ways to apply according to deadlines and the distribution of the load. Much or more than the size of the interest adjustment quality. We need the adjustment is fair and not dismantle the welfare state, if we still believe that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" (Rawls, A Theory of Justice). We must not abandon the welfare state because we can not finance it: we can reduce its size and adapt to what we are able to afford, but the principle is absolute. Although now we are poor, we must not be less fair. Government reforms, however, are strongly ideologized and inspired by the anarchic libertarianism. This applies to labor reform, which seeks flexibility vulgar, but barely scratches the active policies of the labor market, that strengthen the employability or work-life balance policies, which are attributes of flexicurity in force in those EU countries that exhibit the lowest unemployment rates. This ideology is reflected in the tax amnesty and increased VAT What moral force urges efforts the Government employees, the unemployed, and tax payers when the fraudster or amnesty allows banks to act irresponsibly knowing the government, eventually, redeem them?
The Government can not hide behind the need for adjustment, but start with the institutions of exemplary conduct as "Throne and Altar" property tax levy to the Church and reduce the costs of the Royal House. The remuneration and annuities of our politicians should keep pace with the reduction of 30% set by Hollande pay for his government and the French political class. Mr. Rajoy, orderly liquidate nonviable banks, because if you want your benefits are morally justified, must be able to be liquidated or break any company. Banks pass the crisis expected to sell at exorbitant prices which financed speculation, but they were wrong, and now unwilling to take the costs of mismanagement. Go then to collect taxes from multinationals and large Spanish companies, and at the time, with the credibility and moral authority won, go to taxpayers, unions and employers and reclámeles the sacrifices necessary to reconcile the public finances that the powerful were responsible for being wasteful. In politics as in economics, always choose the lesser evil, but the order of actions does alter the product.
What pushes the risk premium is the situation in Spain, but also the design of the euro cojitranco
To work properly the euro governments must respect the rule of thumb: the adjustment begins at home. This means correct the excess savings in some economies, and in others, such as Spanish, excessive spending that has led to an unsustainable level of indebtedness of the private sector, especially business and financial institutions. The public deficit, in itself, is not a serious economic problem, nor the level of debt, if we own currency, but the mismanagement of public spending yes it is, as violating the commitments of financial stability which Spain pledged to sign the Stability and Growth Pact. The crux of the problem, however, is not the deficit but the private sector.
There is no guarantee that we can pay the mortgage of up to 100,000 million, or we can save the 65,000 million from the cuts, but credit to the FROB computed as debt rather than deficit, unlike Ireland, ease credit conditions, and pressure to reduce public spending. It would also help an additional smoothing, the third in the timing of deficit targets, but not immunize us against the full redemption. The recent adjustments which will arrive in summer will be unable to lower the risk premium. In addition, a further reduction of the note of Spain for the agency said Ficht, now two steps of junk bond, reduce the capacity of the Treasury for funding.
To operate the common currency must respect the golden rule: the adjustment begins at home
Some of the pressure on the risk premium is the result of poor macroeconomic management of the Spanish governments, but that pressure subsist because they are the same cuts that generate uncertainty about the resilience of business and collection efficiency of the measures the Government. What pushes the risk premium is, above all, the plight of Spain, but also the design of the euro cojitranco which risks it explodes and disappears. This is the result of German stubbornness in refusing to do their share of adjustment, not to mobilize their excess savings and expand their labor costs and prices, which would help sidestep a recession in Germany, and the rebalancing of the peripherals. The Germans tightened more than necessary and must now carry out an internal revaluation so not to fall into deflation peripherals. Furthermore, the ECB's refusal to generate more inflation and debt purchase in the secondary market more cuts sentence to the periphery. The ECB has an obligation to defend price stability, but also the euro. We therefore hope that Rajoy, as did Monti, Merkel display with the same determination that the adjustments applied to Chancellor trigger an internal reassessment and persuade Germany, incognito, to the ECB to buy debt.
As in the prisoner's dilemma, this is a game of many players with non-cooperative strategies. While it is difficult to estimate how our economy can withstand financed at rates as the current punitive before collapsing. If they were two or three months the situation would claim a government of national concentration, unless, as in the prisoner's dilemma, before we launch a credible threat of leaving the euro to wake from his reverie Merkel national and confronted with the need for a European solution to the crisis, rather than leaving an inheritance a downgrade of German debt, and an area frame as reminiscent of the current eurozone. Not the first time a monetary union were to fail in Europe, but, as in the game of marbles, the fun ends when the one that won all the marbles do not put back in motion.
Manuel Sanchis i Marco is a professor of applied economics at the University of Valencia and Research Associate AQR-IREA at the University of Barcelona.
ユーロを守るために広範な連合
介入は無駄な公共を終了しますが、政府の政策の失敗を証明します。
マヌエル·サンチス30 JUL 2012 - 午前0時05分CET
