スペインの合併したBFAーBANKIA銀行のどの信用金庫が不良債権の"毒"が強かったかで、スペイン国立銀行は、CAJA MADRIDの性にし、損失の危険を予測していたにも関わらず疑問を呈しもせず合併を中止もしなかった。BFA_BANKIA専務理事のJOSE MARIA FERNANDEZ NORNIELLA氏の2011年12月12日の取締役会の報告によると51%はBANCAJAの高"毒"で、20%はCAJA MADRIDの低"毒"で、29%は他の信用金庫の中"毒"で、不良債権による損失"危険"額を209億5800万0000ユーロと予想していた
INFORME DEL ‘NÚMERO DOS’ DE RATO SOBRE EL NEGOCIO INMOBILIARIO
“Tenemos 280 socios promotores inmobiliarios, la mayoría insolventes”
José Manuel Fernández Norniella, encargado de gestionar el ladrillo tóxico acumulado por el grupo Bankia, ilustró al Consejo sobre el colosal problema
Los consejeros de Bankia culpan al auditor de no prevenir del desfase
Caja Madrid concedía préstamos a clientes sin capacidad de pago
Francisco Mercado Madrid 24 SEP 2012 - 20:54 CET
REPORT OF 'number two' time about the real estate business
"We have 280 partners developers, most insolvent"
Jose Manuel Fernandez Norniella, responsible for managing the accumulated toxic brick Bankia group, illustrated the Council on the colossal problem
Bankia counselors blame the auditor for failing to prevent the gap
Caja Madrid provided loans to customers unable to pay
Francisco Mercado Madrid 24 SEP 2012 - 20:54 CET
The debate over what apple boxes contaminated the rest of members of Bankia offers different answers. The Bank of Spain reports contradict the story that Caja Madrid was dragged into the abyss by the toxic financial assets of Bancaja. The Bank of Spain reports highlighted in 2010 with thicker strokes risks suffering Caja Madrid to thread their merger transaction, however, neither questioned nor slowed. Even predicted that he would avoid going into losses.
The view from within the Board of Directors of BFA-Bankia group, the entity resulting from the merger of seven savings banks including Caja Madrid and Bancaja, was different. The December 12, 2011 is a BFA Board of Directors, which draws a bleak picture of the banking group by the Minister José María Fernández Norniella, Rato to number two this had entrusted the management of real estate.
Norniella The report analyzes the situation of the real estate portfolio of the group before and after the merger of the various boxes members. The picture was not at all reassuring. "The current situation is complex with foreclosed assets and investees amounted to 294, of which 47 are 100% owned, 26 have a stake greater than 50% and less than 50% 221. We have over 350 members of which 80% (280) are promoters, mostly insolvent ".
After the story purely statistical problem, Fernandez Norniella attempted to evaluate risks, giving the Valencian Bancaja the worst credit. "The origin is diverse, 51% comes from high risk Bancaja, Caja Madrid 20% of low-risk and 29% of all other boxes with medium risk."
The bottom line, with an economic crisis at its worst and a housing crisis capital, was especially difficult for the Group Bankia. "The resulting situation is of 53,123 units and 10.854 million euros of foreclosed assets. Considering also the assets in companies, we have to manage assets for a total of 28,500 million euros. "
Then Fernandez Norniella exposed risks Bankia and its parent, BFA: "The total risk exposure of 20.958 million euros [similar amount to that end requesting the successor of the then president, Rodrigo Rato, just six months after to revive the bank]. "
The counselor and Rato right hand ended his presentation with bad news for the banking group accounts: "The valuation of assets additional provisions would in this exercise. It is negotiating with the Bank of Spain in time delay and fractionating and prospects look good in the process. "
The counselor suggests that there is a large volume of assets to manage. And therefore defends actions to "isolate the real estate business," and have to be managed by professionals to be "self-financing and attractive to investors." "It takes a comprehensive estate. This decision is a cost of having to anticipate two years taxes for 13 million euros although it would get tax benefits and synergies around 258 million euros between 2012 and 2013. "
Paradoxically, while Fernandez Norniella ensures that session of the Governing Council that the lion's share comes from Bancaja risk, the Bank of Spain, in October 2010 when analyzing all the boxes that were to integrate Bankia, inks burden on Madrid entity. "It is an entity with adjusted solvency and profitability sharply declining. Delinquency elevated upward trend, which is above the group, due mainly to the retail mortgage portfolio, although the developer risk, with significant, and has impacted prominently. Low coverage. High dependence on wholesale markets in emissions by heavy weight on wholesale funding. "
By contrast, Bancaja, the third box for assets then Spain, deserved the following diagnosis: "It is an entity closely linked with a return to traditional banking activities, stressing the importance of their risk exposure and real estate developer. (....) The strong growth of its online lending during expansionary economic cycle, took her to go to the capital markets increasingly. The situation of these markets originated closing its replacement by recourse to the ECB, what precludes adequate diversification of deadlines as maturities occur. Maintains adequate levels of solvency. "
Despite this good diagnosis, the Bank of Spain report pointed some dark spots. "The main weaknesses are the deterioration in lending, especially in the promoter and real estate sectors, the delicate situation of liquidity and business risk."
It was much better the analysis made of smaller boxes as the fusion partners Caja Avila, Caja Segovia, Caja Insular de Canarias Savings: "All of them have a high concentration in the business sector developer-builder and funding to individuals for house purchase. Problems and efficiency results in many of them, a result of the margin squeeze resulting from the lower interest rates, the higher impairment provisions and an oversized network. "
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