スペイン国立銀行は、信用金庫の検査で、不正経営を見て見ぬふり
INFORME DE LOS INSPECTORES DEL BANCO DE ESPAÑA
“La reacción ante los indicios de delito es mirar hacia otro lado”
Consideran que la institución fue “laxa” en la persecución de “remuneraciones estratosféricas”.
Íñigo de Barrón Madrid 5 ENE 2013 - 21:53 CET
INSPECTORS REPORT BANK OF SPAIN
"The reaction to the evidence of crime is looking the other way"
They believe that the institution was "lax" in pursuit of "stratospheric salaries."
Barron Íñigo Madrid 5 ENE 2013 - 21:53 CET
The financial crisis has raised corruption scandals in some savings banks that have ended up in the courts. Judges investigating misappropriation of several executives, which has caused social outrage, accentuated because the entities have required public support of many billions, while the state cut basic services to citizens. It seems that the best environment for action to shelve the Bank of Spain and the review of their supervisory systems, which has obvious flaws. Inspectors Association Bank of Spain in a report denounces the attitude of the supervisor to bad practices. "The usual reaction to evidence of crime is looking the other way," proclaims a sentence of the last paragraph of the document.
Europe claimed the MOU "internal review formal" monitoring methods "to identify weaknesses and make improvements accurate."
The new governor, Luis Linde, announced last July that it would open a commission to analyze monitoring errors and suggest improvements. Ángel Luis López Roa, director of the institution, prepares the report will close shortly. The Deputy Governor, Fernando Restoy, consulted the situation with the inspectors, in a gesture of rapprochement to break more than ten years of heavy fighting. Inspectors Association, which brings to more than 80% of these professionals, welcomed the willingness of the hierarchy and delivered a report with 30 points. They collect improved monitoring and strong criticism of the performance of previous years.
In the latter, entitled "Communication to the judiciary of detected crimes evidence" states: "The usual reaction to evidence of crime is looking the other way." Inspectors added that "in the work of the inspection appears relatively often signs that could be criminal behavior."
Ask for criminal training for staff curb crimes
However, the Inspectors recognize that as your main task is to detect problems of solvency and management of financial institutions, and by "the difficulty of proving complex behaviors", "not active in prosecuting crime. Just ask the number of offenses made communications from the Bank of Spain to the judiciary. " Between 2010 and 2011 there were only proposed administrative penalty in CCM and Cajasur. Last year there was another communications to judges on the CAM and Banco de Valencia.
Officials of the Bank of Spain did not want to comment on the report. So the environment has rejected previous management team, led by Miguel Fernández Ordóñez.
The inspectors proposal to end this situation is to "establish a procedure for communicating hierarchical evidence of crime. Provide training in criminal inspectors and create an inspection team specializes in investigating crimes. "
They denounce the interference of politicians in banking and the supervisor
Financial sources familiar with the inner workings of the supervisor, doubted that there was a systematic concealment of evidence of crimes in the Bank of Spain. In his view, the research processes of entities pass through many hands (inspectors, the group leader, the general direction), which would require large complicity to cover the evidence.
The authors point out that not only relate to offenses billionaires: "Our own work, ensure solvency, leaves gray areas for action. For example, when considering a loan accounts can be found at a ruinous business raising suspicions that someone may ultimately benefit. Or crazy salaries that border the misappropriation or embezzlement. But is our job to investigate that? We have no training to do so. Furthermore, the amount of credit you suspect may not affect the solvency of the entity which is outside of our work. What we want is that there are automated systems for reporting these issues. "
Among the inspectors highlighted the fact that only in the audited entities have found evidence of a crime. "No other had dirty laundry?" They ask. However, the Bank of Spain considers that until it gets total control of an entity not known their true irregularities.
Financial executives surveyed who have demanded anonymity, believe that if the inspectors investigate all these issues overlap with the work of the prosecution. They also note that the allegation made in the report is extremely serious "because no evidence of a crime report is a crime. If you know real cases, should have sent them to the prosecution. Otherwise, it can be as collaborators ".
Also, remember that the decisions to send or not the evidence found in an entity "is a collective decision of the executive committee of the Bank of Spain. The current members are the same as at the time Ordóñez, except the CEO of supervision, Jerome Martinez Tello, the lieutenant governor and the governor. "
In another section of the report, the inspectors asked "reduce the influence" banks "and politicians" to avoid "capture supervisor, to arbitrate the feeling of home" and the flight of the Bank of Spain executives entities .
His accusation is a serious blow to one of the keys to this crisis: "The influence of the current industry has modulated supervision, so that with a supposed good climate for dialogue between supervisor and supervised, has relaxed the application of corrective measures on the deficiencies noted by the inspectors. " For avoidance of doubt, they conclude: "The resolution of the crisis has acted in a way too soft in relation to offenses that could be considered as typified by very serious and affect the solvency and management, has been lax in politics stratospheric remuneration of managers of entities (particularly in boxes, many of which have been partially or fully nationalized finish) or in situations like Alfredo Sáez and other executives criminally convicted. "
In his opinion, the lack of executive financial risk experts in the dome of the Bank of Spain has made serious errors as discussed and interference. "He has acted in a condescending way with mismanagement" point. In one of the footnotes texts say that in 2010, the supervisor lowered the required provisions "basically to save the income of any state." No inspector cites specific cases, but 2010 was a year especially complex for Bankia, key in the Spanish financial crisis.
A suspicious IPO
Bankia The case did not originate in a Bank of Spain data, but on a complaint of UPyD-backed anti-corruption prosecutor-that the National Court Judge Fernando Andreu, took investigate last July. Andreu asked the watchdog to submit the documents for inspection from January 2011, the recovery plan presented by the then president of the organization, Rodrigo Rato, shortly before his resignation in May, and reports relating to the remuneration of directors and executives.
The judge charged 34 former members of the boards of Bankia and its parent (BFA), including José Luis Olivas Rato and (president of Bancaja) alleged offenses of false accounts, unfair administration in the management of the entity and in salaries and manipulation to alter the price of things.
Corruption has commissioned an expert report to inspectors of the Bank of Spain, who asked that track possible "accounting gimmicks" in the IPO of Bankia, in pay, in loans to parties and unions, and accounts 2010 and 2011.
Compensation multimillion
The performance of the anti-corruption prosecutor against several Novacaixagalicia exdirectivos originated in a complaint CIG union. As a result of the investigation on how multimillion compensation was paid after the merger of Caixa Galicia and Caixanova, Anticorruption filed a complaint with the Court against Julio Fernandez Gayoso, president of Caixanova, and four other former leaders of the organization then nationalized.
These four exdirectivos compensation charged, along with their pension plans amounted to 52 million euros. Anticorruption managers felt that they agreed with Fernandez Gayoso "improve senior management contracts" with several clauses blindaban compensation without giving the relevant information to the Board.
In September 2011, Gayoso settled early retirement "without informing the Bank of Spain," according to the complaint of the prosecution. The High Court heard evidence as witnesses two inspectors of the Bank of Spain that produced a report on the remuneration.
The financial collapse of Valencia
The Bank of Spain took a leading role in investigating exdirectivos the Mediterranean Savings Bank (CAM), an entity that the state rescue fund (FROB) intervened in July 2011. The FROB, dependent then the Bank of Spain, took to the director general of the CAM, Maria Dolores Amoros, and its information is basic research for misappropriation against several box exdirectivos Alicante, including Amorós own.
In the case of Banco de Valencia, another entity operated by the FROB in November 2011, the bailout fund last year promoted a civil lawsuit against the bank by exgestores severance packages paid. Furthermore, in June sent to the National Court a report of 200 pages detailing the alleged crimes, from commercial to corporate crime falsehood, having examined the accounts of the company in recent years. And accuses the former CEO, Domingo Parra and president Aguas de Valencia, Eugenio Calabuig to cause harm to the entity with 137 million irregular financial and real estate transactions.
Early interventions
The intervention of CCM by the Bank of Spain in March 2009 was the beginning of the end of the savings system. But then, the government and the supervisor they let notice. The Bank of Spain's research led him to propose administrative penalties for "serious offenses" for former officers and directors. The largest fine (155,000 euros) was for the president, Juan Pedro Hernandez Molto, which investigates the National Court by the former CEO, Ildefonso Ortega, for evidence of unfair administration, false accounting and fraud, although that had been discarded illicit enrichment . The complaint came from former directors of the PP.
The second entity operated by the Bank of Spain was Cajasur, the entity that previously controlled the Church, in May 2010. A proposal by the supervisor, the Ministry of Economy fines were imposed for serious infringements to 38 former directors and executives, including two bishops. There have been at least a particular complaint against Corruption by these facts.
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