http://elpais.com
ドイツ中央銀行(Bundesbank)総裁のウェイデマン(Jens Weidmann)氏の面談記事
“Las condiciones del rescate a España deben ser amplias”
Jens Weidmann es el presidente del Bundesbank, el banco central alemán, guardián de las esencias encargado de evitar a toda costa que la inflación suba en el país
Se muestra contrario a que el BCE compre bonos y a una unión bancaria
Claudi Pérez Fráncfort15 JUN 2012 - 00:46 CET
"The conditions of the rescue for Spain should be comprehensive"
Jens Weidmann is president of the Bundesbank, the German central bank, responsible guardian of the essence to avoid at all costs that inflation rise in the country
Opposes the ECB buying bonds and bank union
Read this interview in English
Check out the special on the crisis of the euro
Claudi Perez Frankfurt 15 JUN 2012 - 00:46 CET
Jens Weidmann is president of the Bundesbank, the German central bank, responsible guardian of the essence to avoid at all costs that inflation rise in the country
Opposes the ECB buying bonds and bank union
Read this interview in English
Check out the special on the crisis of the euro
Claudi Perez Frankfurt 15 JUN 2012 - 00:46 CET
The U.S. economic demon is the Great Depression, the Europe of the German so and so is inflation. The Germans feel mortally afraid of this economic phenomenon, by the memory of the stratospheric price rises of the twenties, for fear that inflation will eat your savings. The guardian of the essence in charge of care to avoid that happening is the Bundesbank, the central bank chaired by Jens Weidmann (Solingen, 1968), which exerts an influence on the ECB imperial. Weidmann, courtly exasesor Chancellor Angela Merkel, he earned the ire of anti-inflation hawks few weeks ago to be openly in favor of wage increases in industry Germanic: a bit of fresh air in that room closed up tight which is the German austerity sacrosanct.
Question. Do you think that 100,000 million are sufficient to rescue Spain, taking into account the direction of the recession and the link between banks and government bonds?
Response. Usually I do not guess with the numbers. Regarding the assessment of funding needs, trust the IMF and the external evaluators. From what we know now, the discussion seems to contain an amount sufficient safety margin. The Spanish government's decision is important because it mitigates the uncertainty about the solvency of banks and thus contributes to the stabilization of financial markets. I also appreciate the fact that the Spanish Government and not expect a financial support without conditions. These should be a fundamental element of any financial aid.
more informationGermany criticizes Spain for a decade of irresponsible managementRajoy prepares appointments Merkel and Obama in a stormThe rescue stigmatized SpainSpain's public debt doubled since the start of the crisisDraghi confirms that it is ready to provide liquidity after the Greek electionsThe Spanish public debt reached its highest level since 1913!ANALYSIS: One step away bonus, you have to renegotiate the "no bail"
P. In the last two years, Spain has implemented reforms in the labor market, pensions and the financial system, has made spending cuts and increased taxes. What will happen now? What reforms have in mind?
R. The key message is that the banking system is a reflection of the economy. Shows the situation of public finances through the link with government bonds. It also reflects the competitiveness of the economy and imbalances that have accumulated in the past, as the real estate bubble. A comprehensive solution includes more reforms and solutions in various fields. Some specific challenges are transparency and control of budget implementation in the regions, and addressing labor market segmentation. Along with labor market reforms already announced, this could give new hope to the young unemployed.
P. But the Spanish government says the opposite: there are only conditions for banks. What are the true conditions for the rescue of Spain?
R. Due to the interconnection of different policy areas, I think the conditions will be broad. The impression that this is a bailout without conditions outside the financial system is already eroding the commitment to the terms of the current programs.
P. Is there a risk that other countries such as Ireland or Portugal, to ask the same conditions and settings?
R. That is precisely the fundamental problem. In Ireland and Portugal there is a debate on the relaxation of the conditions, and Greece is also gaining momentum. But to insist on solving the structural problems will perpetuate the crisis and the market's reaction reflects this concern.
German bank that Spain does not like this rescue as a victory
P. Why not change these principles and make an adjustment smoother?
R. Again, financial aid can only buy time, but does not address the root causes of the crisis. It's like a sedative. If we make sure to cure the disease, we will be worse when wears off. I also doubt that the public support necessary reforms would increase should extend further in time, not to mention the backing of public opinion in countries guaranteeing the rescue mechanism.
P. Do you think that Spain hesitated too long before asking for help?
R. I think the Spanish government hesitated because he hoped that other funding would unconditionally.
P. In Greece there is much debate about the need to renegotiate some aspects of the program. Is there scope to make changes?
R. The bottom line is that there is an agreement signed by all parties involved, including the Greek government. If we now consider that the covenants are open to renegotiation, the Portuguese prime minister, for example, would have difficulty presented to Parliament and explain that it will implement reforms. I think it would be a very risky strategy and hurt the countries that implement reforms at a leisurely pace.
P. Greece is usually described as a special case. Could it be so in a positive sense, in this case, which would set the program to Greece?
R. Greece is already receiving special treatment. Adjustments will last much longer. The country benefited from debt relief exceptional. He received much more support than any other nation. Relax even more this framework, and smoothing is impossible.
P. One of the leaders of the two parties that could rise winners said that the Greek government will request a change of the program. What response would generate a unilateral initiative of Greece?
R. Who is elected in Greece is a democratic decision we all have to accept. But the new Greek government will be linked to existing agreements. If you decide to exit the program unilaterally, in my opinion would no longer be given more financial aid. Greece would have made a decision, but would also have to abide the consequences. All will be affected, but my assessment is that Greece will be who comes out worst stop.
P. Have you developed any contingency plan for an exit Greek?
R. I'm not talking about contingency plans. Only reiterate what I said: the impact of such a decision would certainly be worse for Greece than for others. The result of the possible contagion effects can not be that one accepts that a government has decided unilaterally.
P. If the new Greek government decided not to comply with all agreements, Would it make an exit from the eurozone?
R. Of course there is possibility that the matter gets worse until you get to that situation.
P. So, do not fulfill the pact leads to an exit?
R. Not fulfill the pact leads to the end of funding. This may have implications for their ability to continue in the euro.
P. In retrospect, do you think the introduction of the euro in Greece was a mistake?
R. No doubt remember the heated debate that occurred at the time, in which Germany showed some skepticism. But of course it was a mistake that Greece did not make intelligent use of the benefits of our common currency. The progress was noted, particularly in public finances before the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been treacherous.
P. Some say that Greece can go bankrupt but continue in the euro. How does the Bundesbank that scenario?
R. The point is that only Greece can decide to leave the euro, although this is not foreseen in the EU treaty. As I said before, it will be very difficult for a country insolvent withdrawing financial support to stay in the EMU.
P. But if Greece leave the euro, what will happen with Portugal and across the eurozone? Is not that a greater risk than finance to Greece without conditions and in danger of the Portuguese government to ask the same?
R. I think we agree that both risks are considerable. Naturally, I do not want to speculate on the fact that a country will abandon the euro, still have not seen and would be a very serious event. So I expect that the Greek government to fulfill its agreements. That's my preference.
P. And what are the other risks?
R. One of the great dangers is that the foundations of the stability of the monetary union, we have agreed and enshrined in the articles of the EU treaty, to erode further. This has the potential to undermine confidence in the soundness of the monetary union. E inflate the problems submitted yet more pressure on economic policy. Some voices are already calling on the European Central Bank (ECB) to violate the rules and rescue unconditionally.
P. Does the European Union firewall sufficient to meet a departure from Greece?
R. I do not want to speculate about a departure from Greece. Firewalls that have created and consolidated are there to prevent contagion. And I will not participate in the endless debate about its scope. In any case, we must not allow us to blackmail a country spillovers.
P. Is there a good scenario for Greece and a bad one?
R. Again, my favorite hypothesis is that the Greek Government recognizes the importance that entails meeting their obligations and implement what has been decided. What should be nonnegotiable are goals, not the means by which we achieve. If Greece, for example, is an alternative to provide a certain amount of income apart from what has been agreed, would certainly have room for flexibility.
P. Is it acceptable to extend the program one year?
R. That's a political decision that would have negative consequences for the Union as a whole.
P. In Portugal, seems to project the image of the good student in the program of bailouts, but also is hostage to what happens in Greece and Spain. What message would you send to the Portuguese Government?
R. The key message is that Portugal and Ireland adjustment programs work. The reforms have been implemented there have helped reduce the costs of labor and have slowed the decline in competitiveness. We also see the first benefits of this in the current account deficit. And according to our forecasts, growth should rebound in those countries. No serious prognosis is an endless downward spiral.
P. There is already talk of a second bailout of Portugal, since it is possible that the country can not return to the markets next year. What is your opinion?
R. We are dealing with a crisis of confidence, and trust lost can not recover from overnight. But the important message is that Portugal is on the right track.
P. But not in play throughout the euro?
R. It also has lost confidence in the functioning of monetary union as a whole. This brings us back to the debate about whether we return to the Maastricht framework, which draws on national fiscal policies are only responsible for themselves, or if we make a quantum leap with respect to integration. We can not say on the one hand, we rely on national fiscal policies and, second, the risk mutualisation progressively out of control, thus undermining the current legal framework. At the end is always a question of balance between responsibility and control.
P. Are you saying that if we have no control Eurobonds?
R. I am saying that the common responsibilities are supported only in a completely different context and this context should be demonstrated that ensures fiscal discipline and macroeconomic fundamentals insurance. You can not take the third step before the first.
P. But who controls it? Is it enough to the fiscal pact?
R. Of course not enough. The Bundesbank welcomed gladly the fiscal pact because it strengthens the existing rules. But that is not to give sovereignty. In my view, a fiscal union is something that will cut the budgetary rights of Parliaments, at least if you break the rules. And we see how difficult it is to give fiscal autonomy: even under enormous pressure is very complicated, for example in Spain, subject to conditions. It is perceived as a matter of national pride.
P. What do you mean exactly with common responsibilities?
R. We have common responsibilities through the mechanism of rescue. If we expand, either through a Eurobond or bank-mutualizaríamos union responsibilities to a point that is not covered by the EU treaties and national constitutions. If you really want to move towards a political union, we must recognize a completely new environment, and that means we all have to give up national sovereignty considerable. Means that a central authority can interfere directly in the budget and taxes to enforce the agreements. We must honestly ask ourselves if we are willing to cede so much sovereignty.
P. Do you accept the Germans?
R. At least according to polls, public opinion in Germany would be more willing to embark on further political integration than most countries. The latest Pew Research poll shows that in Germany, 58% favor. In other countries, the attitude is more negative, especially in those who demand more strongly cohesive and responsibilities, such as Italy, Spain or France. We must be honest in this debate. It will take years and years. We would modify the EU treaties and our constitutions, and even hold a referendum, for example in the case of Germany.
Inflation is now the main concern of the entity
P. Would you rather go back to the German mark?
R. No, the German public is clearly committed to a stable common currency.
P. But in the periphery the house is on fire. And some wonder why the ECB is doing. Why not be a lender of last resort?
R. The ECB has already taken many steps to prevent a worsening of the situation. It has reduced interest rates. Continues to provide almost unlimited liquidity conditions very generous and has tried a variety of unusual provisions. In doing so, has significantly expanded its authority. If exercise of lender of last resort for governments redistribute credit risks among domestic taxpayers, for which there is no democratic legitimacy and, therefore, is strictly prohibited in the EU treaties.
P. Do you fear hyperinflation?
R. It is a matter of "distress" by the German hyperinflation. It is the lesson of our most recent European history in the seventies and eighties, when countries like Italy, Spain and France experienced inflation rates unacceptably high. I do not want to reopen the debate with our Italian friends of marriage between the Bank of Italy and the Government until 1981. But I think it was clearly a model that could serve as an example for the future of Europe. All these calls for monetary financing, the central bank to intervene as the only actor capable of doing something, we would return to the seventies.
P. But while there is a mandate to maintain price stability, there is another mandate to maintain financial stability. And there is financial stability in Europe.
R. There is a clear hierarchy. The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability, and ultimately, the best contribution we can make to financial stability. But as I said, the Eurosystem has also helped to prevent an escalation of the crisis in the sense that we cut interest rates to historically low, we provide almost unlimited liquidity to banks, and adopt many unconventional measures. The problem is that if politicians have the impression that they can pass responsibility to another, then opt for the easy way out. And that undermines the independence of central banks.
P. How do you rate President Obama's emphasis on the need for growth and a more expansive?
R. We must recognize that the recession we are seeing in many countries due to lack of confidence in public finances, as well as the erosion of its competitiveness. There is no easy way out, unless you address the causes of these problems. And, no doubt, address this situation by increasing the debt by fiscal stimulus is not the solution.
P. Is America totally wrong?
R. Sometimes one gets the impression that, suddenly, some have realized the importance of growth. But all adjustment programs focus on growth. We must be honest in this debate. To which concern the protagonists of this debate is about a publicly funded incentive packages. And that's something different. May lead to a brief expansion, but aggravate our future problems, because additional debt created, and there are doubts about the sustainability of debt. The excess demand was funded by the appropriations part of the problem, for example when we talk about the housing boom in Spain.
P. Funded by German banks ...
R. No matter who would support it. I'm not talking about the question of who is to blame. I am saying that is an untenable situation.
P. What about the pact on growth? The chancellor has spoken of him.
R. Our problem in Europe is to increase growth potential. If we discuss a pact on growth, this should focus on long-term growth, and therefore on structural reforms. This is also what Merkel has in mind.
P. What about bond projects?
R. To do what?
P. For infrastructure, for example.
R. Why infrastructure? I do not think that Spain and other countries suffer a lack of infrastructure. What I miss is a proper analysis. If there is any impediment to investment, such as in Greece, rather there is an excess of bureaucracy and an inefficient tax system. I do not think that more stimulus programs to smooth the adjustment process.
P. But why not? We have an unemployment rate of 25% in some countries.
R. To give future prospects to the younger generation, we must address the causes of the problem. Spain, for example, had high rates of unemployment in double digits before the housing boom. This is the structure of the economy, not some temporary incentives.
P. But there is only one country in recession, but many, indeed the entire eurozone. How can we expect long-term growth?
R. Look at the projections of Portugal, for example. Is expected to have positive growth rates without further stimuli.
P. We can argue whether that's realistic. In Greece and elsewhere, the forecasts are worsening.
R. Are already seeing some effects of the reforms that have been carried out in unit labor costs, competitiveness and growth of exports. I would not put this in the course desviándome danger and compromising the trust in the policy change should have been done long ago.
P. Are you satisfied with the way in which Italy is undertaking reforms? And with the way you are trying to improve the situation, when an index has fallen 0.8% of GDP, which increasingly gets worse? Do you also see improvement in Italy?
R. Mario Monti has undertaken a major renovation a few months ago. Now they have to be put into practice vigorously. And of course, will take time until they give off.
P. Is it time for the ECB to consider an exit strategy?
R. We have to think of a way out, we need to know how to get out, but no doubt that this is not the time to initiate an output.
P. Not the time, then additional measures?
R. What for?
P. What if conditions worsen?
R. We never commit in advance, but I do not see how increased liquidity would change the situation, given that the liquidity provided to the Spanish banks in Germany recently.
P. Does the activation of the bond purchase program is excluded?
R. The program is inactive. We're not in the market. It's no secret that I have my doubts about this instrument. Take the example of Greece. We are the largest holder of Greek debt. Did you?
P. How long should the ECB to provide liquidity to Greek banks?
R. Our bylaws say we provide liquidity to solvent banks in return for adequate collateral.
P. Why the Bundesbank is imposing barriers to European financial institutions to use the excess liquidity they have in their branches here in Germany as UniCredito or Santander?
R. He is probably referring to the German supervisor supervisory measures, Bafin, not the Bundesbank. In Europe, each supervisor must ensure that its territory banks manage their risks prudently.
P. If the economic situation will worsen even further trim Would they accept the types, or the limit of 1% is a taboo because it could fall into a liquidity trap?
R. We have very few taboos in the Eurosystem, but, again, we never commit in advance. The financial market instability comes from the political uncertainty on the implementation of the program in Greece, and the future of monetary union more generally, and that's not something that can be solved with a rate cut.
P. But the euro is nominally devalue and this would help European exports.
R. Our goal is not the exchange rate. Our objective is price stability. And what helps exports are structural reforms that countries are taking place, no artificial reduction in prices through exchange rate. Therefore, the objective of the Eurosystem is to promote exports by manipulating the exchange rate.
P. What can Germany do to help rebalance the eurozone?
R. Is already implementing a rebalancing: the current account surplus has shrunk to half between 2007 and 2011, and what we are seeing now is, to some extent, a reversal of the situation before the crisis. In the first decade of monetary union, Germany embarked on structural reforms and initiated a wage moderation. Today, in Germany we have growth rates above average, the employment rate is higher than ever and real wages are rising faster than in the past 20 years. Will result in purchasing power and help redress the balance of payments current account. But we are not living on an island. Our main competitors - like the U.S. and China and other emerging economies - are outside the eurozone, so it is very important for Europe as a whole becomes more competitive.
P. Do not fear high inflation of 5% or 6% and large wage increases?
R. In the short run may even see a decline in inflation rates due to falling energy prices. If the German economy is gaining strength, we could see inflation rates above the average, as we saw rates below average in the past. But we're talking about tenths. In the Governing Council we ensure that there is price stability in the entire eurozone. This prevents runaway inflation in Germany because the German economy represents the greatest proportion of the entire eurozone.
P. Apart from the political union, there is a union bank is waiting to be discussed in late June. What do you think of the three points: a pan-European supervision, a deposit guarantee fund and a bank restructuring fund? The Commission presented a proposal, are you satisfied with it?
R. I welcome the proposal of the Commission's bank resolution, but still have to discuss it much because it is very technical, very complicated. But besides that, there are issues of common rules and common supervision, and there are two items involving common responsibilities: a deposit insurance program and a background common common restructuring. These are areas where we currently have a national fiscal responsibility. If mutalizásemos responsibilities in these areas, we would face the same issues of accountability and control in a fiscal union.
P. But not now?
R. Is the issue of balance between control and responsibility. And part of the responsibility in regard to the figures, is impressive: if we think of insuring deposits, these figures are much higher than what we decided to European rescue mechanisms. This is a really important measure, and that is why we have to have a centralized control, and then we can talk about responsibilities. Do not think you can really separate from the rest of the banking union, especially as banks are the largest holders of government debt. We must ensure that through a joint bank not enter by the back door kind of system of Eurobonds, serving as collateral to banks and finance in this way the governments. Why we need strict rules to prevent it. Another related issue is whether the monitoring would be really better if it were centralized.
P. But central banks also say it is necessary to break the vicious circle between government bonds and banks. And one way is to have a common oversight, because oversight in Spain, for example, found a risk of 100,000 million euros in banks.
R. I agree, a joint bank could break the link between government bonds and banks. But again, this is not resolved quickly, since it requires legal changes similar to those of a fiscal union, because it takes a considerable amount of common. And this would interfere much in the national sovereignty and rights of national parliaments. That is the reason why fundamental changes are required, and do not take place overnight. No guarantee deposits of 11 billion euros without being sure that there is control over them.
P. What about using the gold reserves of each central bank to guarantee deposits?
R. Our gold reserves are monetary reserves. The Bundesbank and the Eurosystem central banks are managed independently. And in regard to the Bundesbank, we have no intention of contributing to an insurance program. Indeed, this is not possible for legal reasons.
P. But we need a common guarantee for bank deposits.
R. I see no way to do it now. Finally, each parliament would have to take responsibility for deposits in Europe. If any of these risks materialize, this would jeopardize the possibility for national parliaments to control their budgets. If you have no assurance that risks are under control, this would be a dangerous task.
P. In Germany, the Committee of Wise Men proposed the idea of a European sinking fund was received with enthusiasm in the European Union. What do you think about it?
R. It does not change our assessment that is not legally feasible and that reverses the order of responsibility and control. In practice, supports the guarantee of all debt over 60% of GDP, assuming that everyone follows the rules and returns the part of the debt later. But in the past we have seen how flexible our rules were interpreted. And I think mutualise debt only in the hope to compliance with the rules is very dangerous. All these require constitutional changes.
P. But Germany can not be completely isolated from the rest of the eurozone.
R. Bear the brunt of the rescue packages, all of which benefit from the Triple A rating of Germany. So Germany is the stabilizing anchor, and without it would not work. And it means that Germany has the responsibility to do so. So it is very easy to say that Germany always says "no". This is the reason why is unfair to say that Germany does not play a constructive role.
P. But the problems between Germany and France on the interpretation of how to proceed could jeopardize the euro?
R. Well, first, let's wait until the noise disappears election. And then we'll see how it really works collaboration. I think they have to be realistic about solutions. And if you only speak Eurobond let alone control, all it will do is divert attention. If France were to start a debate on the transfer of national sovereignty, this would make the debate progresase really. The German government is now pushing to create a fiscal union, and is trying to find a solution. I would be happy that President Hollande address this debate and talk about both shared responsibility and the transfer of sovereignty and the new path to political union. But the fact we only ask Eurobonds leads nowhere.
P. Greek debt to be sustainable, economists say will also be necessary to trim the public sector.
R. Greek debt has yet to reach its peak and will not take long to finally bring a sustainable situation. But at this point I have to rely on the analysis of debt sustainability has carried out the Troika.
P.
P.
Question. Do you think that 100,000 million are sufficient to rescue Spain, taking into account the direction of the recession and the link between banks and government bonds?
Response. Usually I do not guess with the numbers. Regarding the assessment of funding needs, trust the IMF and the external evaluators. From what we know now, the discussion seems to contain an amount sufficient safety margin. The Spanish government's decision is important because it mitigates the uncertainty about the solvency of banks and thus contributes to the stabilization of financial markets. I also appreciate the fact that the Spanish Government and not expect a financial support without conditions. These should be a fundamental element of any financial aid.
more informationGermany criticizes Spain for a decade of irresponsible managementRajoy prepares appointments Merkel and Obama in a stormThe rescue stigmatized SpainSpain's public debt doubled since the start of the crisisDraghi confirms that it is ready to provide liquidity after the Greek electionsThe Spanish public debt reached its highest level since 1913!ANALYSIS: One step away bonus, you have to renegotiate the "no bail"
P. In the last two years, Spain has implemented reforms in the labor market, pensions and the financial system, has made spending cuts and increased taxes. What will happen now? What reforms have in mind?
R. The key message is that the banking system is a reflection of the economy. Shows the situation of public finances through the link with government bonds. It also reflects the competitiveness of the economy and imbalances that have accumulated in the past, as the real estate bubble. A comprehensive solution includes more reforms and solutions in various fields. Some specific challenges are transparency and control of budget implementation in the regions, and addressing labor market segmentation. Along with labor market reforms already announced, this could give new hope to the young unemployed.
P. But the Spanish government says the opposite: there are only conditions for banks. What are the true conditions for the rescue of Spain?
R. Due to the interconnection of different policy areas, I think the conditions will be broad. The impression that this is a bailout without conditions outside the financial system is already eroding the commitment to the terms of the current programs.
P. Is there a risk that other countries such as Ireland or Portugal, to ask the same conditions and settings?
R. That is precisely the fundamental problem. In Ireland and Portugal there is a debate on the relaxation of the conditions, and Greece is also gaining momentum. But to insist on solving the structural problems will perpetuate the crisis and the market's reaction reflects this concern.
German bank that Spain does not like this rescue as a victory
P. Why not change these principles and make an adjustment smoother?
R. Again, financial aid can only buy time, but does not address the root causes of the crisis. It's like a sedative. If we make sure to cure the disease, we will be worse when wears off. I also doubt that the public support necessary reforms would increase should extend further in time, not to mention the backing of public opinion in countries guaranteeing the rescue mechanism.
P. Do you think that Spain hesitated too long before asking for help?
R. I think the Spanish government hesitated because he hoped that other funding would unconditionally.
P. In Greece there is much debate about the need to renegotiate some aspects of the program. Is there scope to make changes?
R. The bottom line is that there is an agreement signed by all parties involved, including the Greek government. If we now consider that the covenants are open to renegotiation, the Portuguese prime minister, for example, would have difficulty presented to Parliament and explain that it will implement reforms. I think it would be a very risky strategy and hurt the countries that implement reforms at a leisurely pace.
P. Greece is usually described as a special case. Could it be so in a positive sense, in this case, which would set the program to Greece?
R. Greece is already receiving special treatment. Adjustments will last much longer. The country benefited from debt relief exceptional. He received much more support than any other nation. Relax even more this framework, and smoothing is impossible.
P. One of the leaders of the two parties that could rise winners said that the Greek government will request a change of the program. What response would generate a unilateral initiative of Greece?
R. Who is elected in Greece is a democratic decision we all have to accept. But the new Greek government will be linked to existing agreements. If you decide to exit the program unilaterally, in my opinion would no longer be given more financial aid. Greece would have made a decision, but would also have to abide the consequences. All will be affected, but my assessment is that Greece will be who comes out worst stop.
P. Have you developed any contingency plan for an exit Greek?
R. I'm not talking about contingency plans. Only reiterate what I said: the impact of such a decision would certainly be worse for Greece than for others. The result of the possible contagion effects can not be that one accepts that a government has decided unilaterally.
P. If the new Greek government decided not to comply with all agreements, Would it make an exit from the eurozone?
R. Of course there is possibility that the matter gets worse until you get to that situation.
P. So, do not fulfill the pact leads to an exit?
R. Not fulfill the pact leads to the end of funding. This may have implications for their ability to continue in the euro.
P. In retrospect, do you think the introduction of the euro in Greece was a mistake?
R. No doubt remember the heated debate that occurred at the time, in which Germany showed some skepticism. But of course it was a mistake that Greece did not make intelligent use of the benefits of our common currency. The progress was noted, particularly in public finances before the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been treacherous.
P. Some say that Greece can go bankrupt but continue in the euro. How does the Bundesbank that scenario?
R. The point is that only Greece can decide to leave the euro, although this is not foreseen in the EU treaty. As I said before, it will be very difficult for a country insolvent withdrawing financial support to stay in the EMU.
P. But if Greece leave the euro, what will happen with Portugal and across the eurozone? Is not that a greater risk than finance to Greece without conditions and in danger of the Portuguese government to ask the same?
R. I think we agree that both risks are considerable. Naturally, I do not want to speculate on the fact that a country will abandon the euro, still have not seen and would be a very serious event. So I expect that the Greek government to fulfill its agreements. That's my preference.
P. And what are the other risks?
R. One of the great dangers is that the foundations of the stability of the monetary union, we have agreed and enshrined in the articles of the EU treaty, to erode further. This has the potential to undermine confidence in the soundness of the monetary union. E inflate the problems submitted yet more pressure on economic policy. Some voices are already calling on the European Central Bank (ECB) to violate the rules and rescue unconditionally.
P. Does the European Union firewall sufficient to meet a departure from Greece?
R. I do not want to speculate about a departure from Greece. Firewalls that have created and consolidated are there to prevent contagion. And I will not participate in the endless debate about its scope. In any case, we must not allow us to blackmail a country spillovers.
P. Is there a good scenario for Greece and a bad one?
R. Again, my favorite hypothesis is that the Greek Government recognizes the importance that entails meeting their obligations and implement what has been decided. What should be nonnegotiable are goals, not the means by which we achieve. If Greece, for example, is an alternative to provide a certain amount of income apart from what has been agreed, would certainly have room for flexibility.
P. Is it acceptable to extend the program one year?
R. That's a political decision that would have negative consequences for the Union as a whole.
P. In Portugal, seems to project the image of the good student in the program of bailouts, but also is hostage to what happens in Greece and Spain. What message would you send to the Portuguese Government?
R. The key message is that Portugal and Ireland adjustment programs work. The reforms have been implemented there have helped reduce the costs of labor and have slowed the decline in competitiveness. We also see the first benefits of this in the current account deficit. And according to our forecasts, growth should rebound in those countries. No serious prognosis is an endless downward spiral.
P. There is already talk of a second bailout of Portugal, since it is possible that the country can not return to the markets next year. What is your opinion?
R. We are dealing with a crisis of confidence, and trust lost can not recover from overnight. But the important message is that Portugal is on the right track.
P. But not in play throughout the euro?
R. It also has lost confidence in the functioning of monetary union as a whole. This brings us back to the debate about whether we return to the Maastricht framework, which draws on national fiscal policies are only responsible for themselves, or if we make a quantum leap with respect to integration. We can not say on the one hand, we rely on national fiscal policies and, second, the risk mutualisation progressively out of control, thus undermining the current legal framework. At the end is always a question of balance between responsibility and control.
P. Are you saying that if we have no control Eurobonds?
R. I am saying that the common responsibilities are supported only in a completely different context and this context should be demonstrated that ensures fiscal discipline and macroeconomic fundamentals insurance. You can not take the third step before the first.
P. But who controls it? Is it enough to the fiscal pact?
R. Of course not enough. The Bundesbank welcomed gladly the fiscal pact because it strengthens the existing rules. But that is not to give sovereignty. In my view, a fiscal union is something that will cut the budgetary rights of Parliaments, at least if you break the rules. And we see how difficult it is to give fiscal autonomy: even under enormous pressure is very complicated, for example in Spain, subject to conditions. It is perceived as a matter of national pride.
P. What do you mean exactly with common responsibilities?
R. We have common responsibilities through the mechanism of rescue. If we expand, either through a Eurobond or bank-mutualizaríamos union responsibilities to a point that is not covered by the EU treaties and national constitutions. If you really want to move towards a political union, we must recognize a completely new environment, and that means we all have to give up national sovereignty considerable. Means that a central authority can interfere directly in the budget and taxes to enforce the agreements. We must honestly ask ourselves if we are willing to cede so much sovereignty.
P. Do you accept the Germans?
R. At least according to polls, public opinion in Germany would be more willing to embark on further political integration than most countries. The latest Pew Research poll shows that in Germany, 58% favor. In other countries, the attitude is more negative, especially in those who demand more strongly cohesive and responsibilities, such as Italy, Spain or France. We must be honest in this debate. It will take years and years. We would modify the EU treaties and our constitutions, and even hold a referendum, for example in the case of Germany.
Inflation is now the main concern of the entity
P. Would you rather go back to the German mark?
R. No, the German public is clearly committed to a stable common currency.
P. But in the periphery the house is on fire. And some wonder why the ECB is doing. Why not be a lender of last resort?
R. The ECB has already taken many steps to prevent a worsening of the situation. It has reduced interest rates. Continues to provide almost unlimited liquidity conditions very generous and has tried a variety of unusual provisions. In doing so, has significantly expanded its authority. If exercise of lender of last resort for governments redistribute credit risks among domestic taxpayers, for which there is no democratic legitimacy and, therefore, is strictly prohibited in the EU treaties.
P. Do you fear hyperinflation?
R. It is a matter of "distress" by the German hyperinflation. It is the lesson of our most recent European history in the seventies and eighties, when countries like Italy, Spain and France experienced inflation rates unacceptably high. I do not want to reopen the debate with our Italian friends of marriage between the Bank of Italy and the Government until 1981. But I think it was clearly a model that could serve as an example for the future of Europe. All these calls for monetary financing, the central bank to intervene as the only actor capable of doing something, we would return to the seventies.
P. But while there is a mandate to maintain price stability, there is another mandate to maintain financial stability. And there is financial stability in Europe.
R. There is a clear hierarchy. The primary objective of the Eurosystem is to maintain price stability, and ultimately, the best contribution we can make to financial stability. But as I said, the Eurosystem has also helped to prevent an escalation of the crisis in the sense that we cut interest rates to historically low, we provide almost unlimited liquidity to banks, and adopt many unconventional measures. The problem is that if politicians have the impression that they can pass responsibility to another, then opt for the easy way out. And that undermines the independence of central banks.
P. How do you rate President Obama's emphasis on the need for growth and a more expansive?
R. We must recognize that the recession we are seeing in many countries due to lack of confidence in public finances, as well as the erosion of its competitiveness. There is no easy way out, unless you address the causes of these problems. And, no doubt, address this situation by increasing the debt by fiscal stimulus is not the solution.
P. Is America totally wrong?
R. Sometimes one gets the impression that, suddenly, some have realized the importance of growth. But all adjustment programs focus on growth. We must be honest in this debate. To which concern the protagonists of this debate is about a publicly funded incentive packages. And that's something different. May lead to a brief expansion, but aggravate our future problems, because additional debt created, and there are doubts about the sustainability of debt. The excess demand was funded by the appropriations part of the problem, for example when we talk about the housing boom in Spain.
P. Funded by German banks ...
R. No matter who would support it. I'm not talking about the question of who is to blame. I am saying that is an untenable situation.
P. What about the pact on growth? The chancellor has spoken of him.
R. Our problem in Europe is to increase growth potential. If we discuss a pact on growth, this should focus on long-term growth, and therefore on structural reforms. This is also what Merkel has in mind.
P. What about bond projects?
R. To do what?
P. For infrastructure, for example.
R. Why infrastructure? I do not think that Spain and other countries suffer a lack of infrastructure. What I miss is a proper analysis. If there is any impediment to investment, such as in Greece, rather there is an excess of bureaucracy and an inefficient tax system. I do not think that more stimulus programs to smooth the adjustment process.
P. But why not? We have an unemployment rate of 25% in some countries.
R. To give future prospects to the younger generation, we must address the causes of the problem. Spain, for example, had high rates of unemployment in double digits before the housing boom. This is the structure of the economy, not some temporary incentives.
P. But there is only one country in recession, but many, indeed the entire eurozone. How can we expect long-term growth?
R. Look at the projections of Portugal, for example. Is expected to have positive growth rates without further stimuli.
P. We can argue whether that's realistic. In Greece and elsewhere, the forecasts are worsening.
R. Are already seeing some effects of the reforms that have been carried out in unit labor costs, competitiveness and growth of exports. I would not put this in the course desviándome danger and compromising the trust in the policy change should have been done long ago.
P. Are you satisfied with the way in which Italy is undertaking reforms? And with the way you are trying to improve the situation, when an index has fallen 0.8% of GDP, which increasingly gets worse? Do you also see improvement in Italy?
R. Mario Monti has undertaken a major renovation a few months ago. Now they have to be put into practice vigorously. And of course, will take time until they give off.
P. Is it time for the ECB to consider an exit strategy?
R. We have to think of a way out, we need to know how to get out, but no doubt that this is not the time to initiate an output.
P. Not the time, then additional measures?
R. What for?
P. What if conditions worsen?
R. We never commit in advance, but I do not see how increased liquidity would change the situation, given that the liquidity provided to the Spanish banks in Germany recently.
P. Does the activation of the bond purchase program is excluded?
R. The program is inactive. We're not in the market. It's no secret that I have my doubts about this instrument. Take the example of Greece. We are the largest holder of Greek debt. Did you?
P. How long should the ECB to provide liquidity to Greek banks?
R. Our bylaws say we provide liquidity to solvent banks in return for adequate collateral.
P. Why the Bundesbank is imposing barriers to European financial institutions to use the excess liquidity they have in their branches here in Germany as UniCredito or Santander?
R. He is probably referring to the German supervisor supervisory measures, Bafin, not the Bundesbank. In Europe, each supervisor must ensure that its territory banks manage their risks prudently.
P. If the economic situation will worsen even further trim Would they accept the types, or the limit of 1% is a taboo because it could fall into a liquidity trap?
R. We have very few taboos in the Eurosystem, but, again, we never commit in advance. The financial market instability comes from the political uncertainty on the implementation of the program in Greece, and the future of monetary union more generally, and that's not something that can be solved with a rate cut.
P. But the euro is nominally devalue and this would help European exports.
R. Our goal is not the exchange rate. Our objective is price stability. And what helps exports are structural reforms that countries are taking place, no artificial reduction in prices through exchange rate. Therefore, the objective of the Eurosystem is to promote exports by manipulating the exchange rate.
P. What can Germany do to help rebalance the eurozone?
R. Is already implementing a rebalancing: the current account surplus has shrunk to half between 2007 and 2011, and what we are seeing now is, to some extent, a reversal of the situation before the crisis. In the first decade of monetary union, Germany embarked on structural reforms and initiated a wage moderation. Today, in Germany we have growth rates above average, the employment rate is higher than ever and real wages are rising faster than in the past 20 years. Will result in purchasing power and help redress the balance of payments current account. But we are not living on an island. Our main competitors - like the U.S. and China and other emerging economies - are outside the eurozone, so it is very important for Europe as a whole becomes more competitive.
P. Do not fear high inflation of 5% or 6% and large wage increases?
R. In the short run may even see a decline in inflation rates due to falling energy prices. If the German economy is gaining strength, we could see inflation rates above the average, as we saw rates below average in the past. But we're talking about tenths. In the Governing Council we ensure that there is price stability in the entire eurozone. This prevents runaway inflation in Germany because the German economy represents the greatest proportion of the entire eurozone.
P. Apart from the political union, there is a union bank is waiting to be discussed in late June. What do you think of the three points: a pan-European supervision, a deposit guarantee fund and a bank restructuring fund? The Commission presented a proposal, are you satisfied with it?
R. I welcome the proposal of the Commission's bank resolution, but still have to discuss it much because it is very technical, very complicated. But besides that, there are issues of common rules and common supervision, and there are two items involving common responsibilities: a deposit insurance program and a background common common restructuring. These are areas where we currently have a national fiscal responsibility. If mutalizásemos responsibilities in these areas, we would face the same issues of accountability and control in a fiscal union.
P. But not now?
R. Is the issue of balance between control and responsibility. And part of the responsibility in regard to the figures, is impressive: if we think of insuring deposits, these figures are much higher than what we decided to European rescue mechanisms. This is a really important measure, and that is why we have to have a centralized control, and then we can talk about responsibilities. Do not think you can really separate from the rest of the banking union, especially as banks are the largest holders of government debt. We must ensure that through a joint bank not enter by the back door kind of system of Eurobonds, serving as collateral to banks and finance in this way the governments. Why we need strict rules to prevent it. Another related issue is whether the monitoring would be really better if it were centralized.
P. But central banks also say it is necessary to break the vicious circle between government bonds and banks. And one way is to have a common oversight, because oversight in Spain, for example, found a risk of 100,000 million euros in banks.
R. I agree, a joint bank could break the link between government bonds and banks. But again, this is not resolved quickly, since it requires legal changes similar to those of a fiscal union, because it takes a considerable amount of common. And this would interfere much in the national sovereignty and rights of national parliaments. That is the reason why fundamental changes are required, and do not take place overnight. No guarantee deposits of 11 billion euros without being sure that there is control over them.
P. What about using the gold reserves of each central bank to guarantee deposits?
R. Our gold reserves are monetary reserves. The Bundesbank and the Eurosystem central banks are managed independently. And in regard to the Bundesbank, we have no intention of contributing to an insurance program. Indeed, this is not possible for legal reasons.
P. But we need a common guarantee for bank deposits.
R. I see no way to do it now. Finally, each parliament would have to take responsibility for deposits in Europe. If any of these risks materialize, this would jeopardize the possibility for national parliaments to control their budgets. If you have no assurance that risks are under control, this would be a dangerous task.
P. In Germany, the Committee of Wise Men proposed the idea of a European sinking fund was received with enthusiasm in the European Union. What do you think about it?
R. It does not change our assessment that is not legally feasible and that reverses the order of responsibility and control. In practice, supports the guarantee of all debt over 60% of GDP, assuming that everyone follows the rules and returns the part of the debt later. But in the past we have seen how flexible our rules were interpreted. And I think mutualise debt only in the hope to compliance with the rules is very dangerous. All these require constitutional changes.
P. But Germany can not be completely isolated from the rest of the eurozone.
R. Bear the brunt of the rescue packages, all of which benefit from the Triple A rating of Germany. So Germany is the stabilizing anchor, and without it would not work. And it means that Germany has the responsibility to do so. So it is very easy to say that Germany always says "no". This is the reason why is unfair to say that Germany does not play a constructive role.
P. But the problems between Germany and France on the interpretation of how to proceed could jeopardize the euro?
R. Well, first, let's wait until the noise disappears election. And then we'll see how it really works collaboration. I think they have to be realistic about solutions. And if you only speak Eurobond let alone control, all it will do is divert attention. If France were to start a debate on the transfer of national sovereignty, this would make the debate progresase really. The German government is now pushing to create a fiscal union, and is trying to find a solution. I would be happy that President Hollande address this debate and talk about both shared responsibility and the transfer of sovereignty and the new path to political union. But the fact we only ask Eurobonds leads nowhere.
P. Greek debt to be sustainable, economists say will also be necessary to trim the public sector.
R. Greek debt has yet to reach its peak and will not take long to finally bring a sustainable situation. But at this point I have to rely on the analysis of debt sustainability has carried out the Troika.
P.
P.
ドイツ中央銀行(Bundesbank)総裁のウェイデマン(Jens Weidmann)氏の面談記事
0 件のコメント:
コメントを投稿