http://elpais.com
今回のギリシアやスペインの銀行破綻の金融危機にたいするドイツ政府の利己主義な遅延の対応は、きわどい欧州金融危機(破滅)の脅威に直面させる
Esta vez, Europa está de verdad al borde del precipicio
La gestión de la crisis por Alemania amenaza con repetir las tensiones del pasado siglo
time, Europe is really on the brink
The crisis management by Germany threatens to repeat the tensions of the last century
Check out the special on the crisis of the euro
Niall Ferguson / Nouriel Roubini 10 JUN 2012 - 01:00 CET
The crisis management by Germany threatens to repeat the tensions of the last century
Check out the special on the crisis of the euro
Niall Ferguson / Nouriel Roubini 10 JUN 2012 - 01:00 CET
We fear that the German Government's policy of doing something useful and of little, too late to cause a risk just a repeat of the crisis in mid-twentieth century that European integration was intended to prevent.
We find it extraordinary that Germany is precisely what seems to have learned from history. Obsessed with the nonexistent threat of inflation, it seems that today's Germany attaches more importance to the year 1923 (the year of hyperinflation) than 1933 (the year of the death of democracy). The Germans would not hurt to remember that a European banking crisis occurred two years prior to 1933 contributed directly to the breakdown of democracy, not only in their own country, but throughout the continent.
more informationSpain asks for a ransom of up to 100,000 million for the dealerHow did we get here?, By Joaquin ESTEFANÍAThe 'hot spots' of bankingThe Government is prepared to fight the word rescueHow does the European bailout for the financial sector?Other countries have already doneAfter a rescue, low life expectancy
For more than three years warning that Europe needed to clean the unfortunate Continental statements from their banks. They did virtually nothing. Meanwhile, two years ago is spreading panic among banks silent on the periphery of the eurozone: it has reduced cross-border financial services, bank and general, and replaced by funding from the ECB, and the smart money-large uninsured deposits of high-income people has left the coasts of Greece and other Mediterranean banks.
But now the public is losing confidence, and panic can be extended to smaller deposits uninsured. If Greece leave the euro, there would be a freeze on deposits and euro deposits would become the new drachma: therefore, a Greek bank in the euro is not equivalent to one euro in a German bank. The Greeks have withdrawn more than 700 million euros of its banks in the last month.
More worrisome is that last month there was an increase in withdrawals of money from some Spanish banks. The clumsy Bankia rescue operation conducted by the Government has only served to increase public concern. On a recent visit to Barcelona, one of us was asked several times if it was safe to have money in a Spanish bank. This type of process can be explosive. What is today a quiet visit to the bank may become a race of every man for himself. In the event the output of Greece, rational people would ask: who is next?
As discussed at a meeting of Nicolas Berggruen Institute held in Rome last week, the way out of this crisis seems clear.
It is extraordinary that it is Germany that seems to have learned from history
First, it is necessary to establish a recapitalization program, through preference shares without voting rights-of eurozone banks in both the periphery and in the center, directly across the European Financial Stability Instrument (IEEF) and successor, the Financial Stability Mechanism (ESM).
The current strategy based recapitalize banks that borrow States to domestic bond markets-or-has proved disastrous IEEF in Ireland and Greece has caused an explosion of public debt and has made the state was even more insolvent banks while they become a greater risk to the extent that most of the public debt is in your hands.
Second, to avoid panic in the banks of the eurozone, a phenomenon safe exit in case of Greece and very likely in any case, you need to create a European system of deposit insurance.
In order to reduce moral hazard (as well as risk of stock price and credit risk assumed by the taxpayers of the eurozone), one should also take other measures:
1. The deposit guarantee program to be financed with bank levies appropriate: it could be a financial transactions tax, or better yet, a tax on all bank liabilities.
2. It is necessary to implement a bank resolution program in which unsecured creditors, minority-majority and be the first to pay, before resorting to taxpayer money to cover losses from a bank.
3. Should be taken to limit the size of banks in order to avoid the problem of too large entities to fall.
4. We also support a system of supervision and regulation across the EU.
One euro in a Greek bank is not equivalent to one euro in a German bank
It is true that the European fund deposit guarantee will not work if there is continued risk of a country leaving the eurozone. Guaranteeing deposits in euros would be very expensive, because the country in question would need to convert all the debt to a new national currency, which quickly depreciate against the euro. On the other hand, if the deposit insurance applies only while the country does not abandon the euro, will be unable to prevent a bank run. It is therefore necessary to take further steps to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of dropouts in the eurozone.
We must accelerate structural reforms that encourage productivity growth. Among the policies that can achieve this are monetary easing by the ECB, a weaker euro, a fiscal stimulus in the core, more infrastructure spending to reduce bottlenecks and facilitate the supply in the periphery (preferably , with a golden rule for public investment) and wage increases above productivity at the center to boost income and consumption.
Finally, given the volume of unsustainable public debt and borrowing costs of several Member States, we see no possible alternative to some form of pooling of debt.
Currently there are several proposals for eurobonds. Among them, we prefer is that of a Redemption Fund makes the German Council of Economic Advisers, not because it is the best, but because it is the only way to alleviate German concerns about the prospect of taking excessive credit risk.
The ERF is a provisional program will not result in a permanent Eurobond. It has sufficient guarantees and age appropriate, in addition to very strong conditions. The main danger is that any proposal that is acceptable to Germany would be such a loss of fiscal sovereignty for States that would be unacceptable to a periphery of the eurozone, especially Italy and Spain.
Cede some sovereignty is inevitable. However, there is a difference between federalism and neo-colonialism, as we said a veteran politician in NBI meeting in Rome.
Given the volume of unsustainable debt, we see no possible alternative to some form of pooling
Until recently, the German position on these proposals has always been negative. German is understandable concern about moral hazard. It will be difficult to justify the fact that he has risked the money from the Germans in the periphery if not carried out substantial reforms. But it is inevitable that these reforms tarden some time yet. The structural reform of German labor market was not exactly a success overnight. By contrast, the European banking crisis is a financial risk that could skyrocket in a matter of days.
The Germans must realize that bank recapitalization, the European insurance of deposits and debt pooling are not optional. These measures are essential to prevent irreversible disintegration of the European monetary union. If you still are not convinced, must understand that the costs of breaking the eurozone would be astronomical, for Germany as well as for the rest of the world.
In the final analysis, the current prosperity of Germany is largely a consequence of monetary union. The euro has made German exporters an exchange rate much more competitive than the old frame. And the rest of the eurozone is still the target of 42% of German exports. Plunging the half of the market in a depression can not be beneficial for Germany.
At the moment of truth, as recognized by Chancellor Merkel last week, monetary union was always implicit in it a greater integration into a fiscal and political union.
But before Europe think of taking this historic step, you must demonstrate that he has learned the lessons of the past. The EU was created to avoid repeating the disasters of the thirties. It is time that European leaders-and especially the Germans are aware that they are dangerously close to hitting it.
Niall Ferguson is professor of Harvard University, his latest book is Civilization: The West and the rest. Nouriel Roubini is a professor at the University of New York and chairman of Roubini Global Economics. Both are members of the Council for the Future of Europe Nicolas Berggruen Institute.
Translated by Maria Luisa Rodriguez Tapia.
We find it extraordinary that Germany is precisely what seems to have learned from history. Obsessed with the nonexistent threat of inflation, it seems that today's Germany attaches more importance to the year 1923 (the year of hyperinflation) than 1933 (the year of the death of democracy). The Germans would not hurt to remember that a European banking crisis occurred two years prior to 1933 contributed directly to the breakdown of democracy, not only in their own country, but throughout the continent.
more informationSpain asks for a ransom of up to 100,000 million for the dealerHow did we get here?, By Joaquin ESTEFANÍAThe 'hot spots' of bankingThe Government is prepared to fight the word rescueHow does the European bailout for the financial sector?Other countries have already doneAfter a rescue, low life expectancy
For more than three years warning that Europe needed to clean the unfortunate Continental statements from their banks. They did virtually nothing. Meanwhile, two years ago is spreading panic among banks silent on the periphery of the eurozone: it has reduced cross-border financial services, bank and general, and replaced by funding from the ECB, and the smart money-large uninsured deposits of high-income people has left the coasts of Greece and other Mediterranean banks.
But now the public is losing confidence, and panic can be extended to smaller deposits uninsured. If Greece leave the euro, there would be a freeze on deposits and euro deposits would become the new drachma: therefore, a Greek bank in the euro is not equivalent to one euro in a German bank. The Greeks have withdrawn more than 700 million euros of its banks in the last month.
More worrisome is that last month there was an increase in withdrawals of money from some Spanish banks. The clumsy Bankia rescue operation conducted by the Government has only served to increase public concern. On a recent visit to Barcelona, one of us was asked several times if it was safe to have money in a Spanish bank. This type of process can be explosive. What is today a quiet visit to the bank may become a race of every man for himself. In the event the output of Greece, rational people would ask: who is next?
As discussed at a meeting of Nicolas Berggruen Institute held in Rome last week, the way out of this crisis seems clear.
It is extraordinary that it is Germany that seems to have learned from history
First, it is necessary to establish a recapitalization program, through preference shares without voting rights-of eurozone banks in both the periphery and in the center, directly across the European Financial Stability Instrument (IEEF) and successor, the Financial Stability Mechanism (ESM).
The current strategy based recapitalize banks that borrow States to domestic bond markets-or-has proved disastrous IEEF in Ireland and Greece has caused an explosion of public debt and has made the state was even more insolvent banks while they become a greater risk to the extent that most of the public debt is in your hands.
Second, to avoid panic in the banks of the eurozone, a phenomenon safe exit in case of Greece and very likely in any case, you need to create a European system of deposit insurance.
In order to reduce moral hazard (as well as risk of stock price and credit risk assumed by the taxpayers of the eurozone), one should also take other measures:
1. The deposit guarantee program to be financed with bank levies appropriate: it could be a financial transactions tax, or better yet, a tax on all bank liabilities.
2. It is necessary to implement a bank resolution program in which unsecured creditors, minority-majority and be the first to pay, before resorting to taxpayer money to cover losses from a bank.
3. Should be taken to limit the size of banks in order to avoid the problem of too large entities to fall.
4. We also support a system of supervision and regulation across the EU.
One euro in a Greek bank is not equivalent to one euro in a German bank
It is true that the European fund deposit guarantee will not work if there is continued risk of a country leaving the eurozone. Guaranteeing deposits in euros would be very expensive, because the country in question would need to convert all the debt to a new national currency, which quickly depreciate against the euro. On the other hand, if the deposit insurance applies only while the country does not abandon the euro, will be unable to prevent a bank run. It is therefore necessary to take further steps to reduce the likelihood of occurrence of dropouts in the eurozone.
We must accelerate structural reforms that encourage productivity growth. Among the policies that can achieve this are monetary easing by the ECB, a weaker euro, a fiscal stimulus in the core, more infrastructure spending to reduce bottlenecks and facilitate the supply in the periphery (preferably , with a golden rule for public investment) and wage increases above productivity at the center to boost income and consumption.
Finally, given the volume of unsustainable public debt and borrowing costs of several Member States, we see no possible alternative to some form of pooling of debt.
Currently there are several proposals for eurobonds. Among them, we prefer is that of a Redemption Fund makes the German Council of Economic Advisers, not because it is the best, but because it is the only way to alleviate German concerns about the prospect of taking excessive credit risk.
The ERF is a provisional program will not result in a permanent Eurobond. It has sufficient guarantees and age appropriate, in addition to very strong conditions. The main danger is that any proposal that is acceptable to Germany would be such a loss of fiscal sovereignty for States that would be unacceptable to a periphery of the eurozone, especially Italy and Spain.
Cede some sovereignty is inevitable. However, there is a difference between federalism and neo-colonialism, as we said a veteran politician in NBI meeting in Rome.
Given the volume of unsustainable debt, we see no possible alternative to some form of pooling
Until recently, the German position on these proposals has always been negative. German is understandable concern about moral hazard. It will be difficult to justify the fact that he has risked the money from the Germans in the periphery if not carried out substantial reforms. But it is inevitable that these reforms tarden some time yet. The structural reform of German labor market was not exactly a success overnight. By contrast, the European banking crisis is a financial risk that could skyrocket in a matter of days.
The Germans must realize that bank recapitalization, the European insurance of deposits and debt pooling are not optional. These measures are essential to prevent irreversible disintegration of the European monetary union. If you still are not convinced, must understand that the costs of breaking the eurozone would be astronomical, for Germany as well as for the rest of the world.
In the final analysis, the current prosperity of Germany is largely a consequence of monetary union. The euro has made German exporters an exchange rate much more competitive than the old frame. And the rest of the eurozone is still the target of 42% of German exports. Plunging the half of the market in a depression can not be beneficial for Germany.
At the moment of truth, as recognized by Chancellor Merkel last week, monetary union was always implicit in it a greater integration into a fiscal and political union.
But before Europe think of taking this historic step, you must demonstrate that he has learned the lessons of the past. The EU was created to avoid repeating the disasters of the thirties. It is time that European leaders-and especially the Germans are aware that they are dangerously close to hitting it.
Niall Ferguson is professor of Harvard University, his latest book is Civilization: The West and the rest. Nouriel Roubini is a professor at the University of New York and chairman of Roubini Global Economics. Both are members of the Council for the Future of Europe Nicolas Berggruen Institute.
Translated by Maria Luisa Rodriguez Tapia.
0 件のコメント:
コメントを投稿