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どのような経緯で、スペインの"銀行の破綻"に至ったのか?
¿Cómo hemos llegado hasta aquí?
El Gobierno ha estado acuartelado durante el tiempo de espera al rescate
How did we get here?
The government has been quartered during the waiting time to the rescue
Check out the special on the crisis of the euro
Joaquin Stephanie 9 JUN 2012 - 15:33 CET
The government has been quartered during the waiting time to the rescue
Check out the special on the crisis of the euro
Joaquin Stephanie 9 JUN 2012 - 15:33 CET
The government's main aim was to avoid Rajoy outside intervention in the Spanish economy. This attempt failed, now enters a new political phase in which the discussion is in the type of rescue that the Troika (Brussels, European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund) will practice. As the troops of an army on the eve of a war, the waiting time to resolve this issue have been plentiful today quartered the official centers of economic decision in Spain. Never before has so far been so sparse that power of decision.
First, the Ministry of Economy (Luis de Guindos), for the first time in the history of contemporary crises (the 51 banks, 50% of the total existing-, 14 savings banks and 20 credit unions fallen between the second half of the 70's and early eighties, the intervention of Banesto Mario Conde and subsequent sale to Santander) has taken directly through the body with little supervisor, the nationalization of institutions, public money that are given, the solution to the problems associated with the growth of toxic real estate assets within banks and savings banks, the valuation of that crap, the name of the new managers and the end of the ancients. It has done surrounded by the big bankers (Loot, Gonzalez, Fainé ...) that have served as consultants: the fox in the henhouse.
more informationSpain asks for a ransom of up to 100,000 million for the dealerThe IMF anticipates the report which brought about the bank bailout in SpainThe Government is prepared to fight the word rescueThe 'black spots' in the financial sectorGuindos audits are required by the EU for a bailout of the bankingHow does banking helps?OPINION: This time, Europe is really on the brinkEDITORIAL: Waiting for the rescue
Second, a Minister of Finance (Cristobal Montoro), whose parliamentary speeches and statements to the media must qualify at least clumsy, always in a different tempo of Guindos, and still has not walked the halls of European machines which is deciding the future of the Spanish economy, which affects both his department (State Budget).
Third is the Economic Office of the Presidency who is who holds the secretariat of the Executive Committee for Economic Affairs in the scheme devised by its president, Mariano Rajoy. It is the first time this charge is not hosted by the Ministry of Economy. Travelers who have recently seen the owner, Alvaro Nadal, they say that it is in this last center of power (the most influential in Rajoy) in which more doubts have been expressed about the future of the euro and where they are discussed on consequences of abandoning the single currency by other countries such as Greece.
Finally there is the Bank of Spain, so far with institutional prestige, which has been marginalized, discredited and silenced, particularly in the last and most important phase of the banking crisis: nationalization of Bankia. With a governor (Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez) halved by the Minister of Economy in solving the difficulties of the country's fourth largest financial institution, and stigmatized by the leaders of the PP as the best possible culprit to try to diffuse the responsibility of managers Bankia, so tied to the history of the ruling party (Rodrigo Rato, the author of the economic miracle was Aznar, and Miguel Blesa, the friend of former president, who came to the dome of Bankia just for that friendship, untouched by previous financial responsibilities) and the regions more interventionist in some of the outrages that have urban on the ropes to the two largest savings banks that made the bank (Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, and Valencia Francisco Camps).
Never the Economy Ministry had assumed so much prominence. And so little, the Bank of Spain
Many decision centers have multiplied the lost time, the contradictory statements, the parallel stories do not always coincide, different ways of understanding the solutions, and this has significantly affected the market confidence in the Spanish government (notably impaired), put into question their technical skills, and discussed the credibility of the figures contributed to Brussels, which has led to something unusual: the privatization of the banking supervisory activities, responsible for two international consulting firms to the detriment of the Bank of Spain. The new governor, Luis Linde, it will be corrected quickly if you do not want to bear the disappointment of its officers and inspectors.
What happened to all deteriorate so much?
November 2008: for the first time a president of the Spanish government (Rodríguez Zapatero) attends the summit of G20 leaders and hobnobs with Bush, Merkel ... has been invited by Sarkozy, but his presence that supports the considered one of the most effective regulation of the financial system. Precisely because of the banking crisis cited the seventies and eighties, Spain had adopted legislation and practices at that time were the envy of the world. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown praised her publicly, and hypercritical Wall Street Journal today carried a front-page the following reflection: the Spanish model is the one to take to alleviate the debacle prompted by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and nationalization of a significant part of American banking, British and German, among others.
This legislation cumulative product of the experience of people like Mariano Rubio, Luis Angel Rojo, Aristobulus of John, Angel Madroñero, Jose Luis Nunez, father of Soledad Núñez, Lt. Governor wannabe-etc. probably not considering the possibility of a long and deep as deterioration of the overall economy, as that is suffering. A crisis that has required ongoing efforts to recapitalize the banks, which has deteriorated to the extent the quality of its real estate and business assets, which are growing the overall delinquency rates above double digits.
So many contradictions in the government to call into question his technical prowess markets
Of these factors, which so far has played a decisive role has been the explosion of a housing bubble that lasted at least a decade: between 1997 and 2007 construction grew at rate of 5% per year. In those years the housing stock increased by 5.7 million households, nearly 30% of all existing and presentation of the price reached 191%. In 1998 the building was nearly 14% of overall employment in Spain, twice in Germany and five points higher than in the UK. That year, the Aznar government passes a law Soil multiplying the irrational exuberance of the building sector: all developable land is declared unless it is expressly forbidden. It favors an extraordinary boom in construction and purchases related to it. But not in the sense that defended the PP (increase the number of floors and therefore lower prices for them) but in the speculative: homes were purchased because they were not cheap but because they were expensive and in the future they would to be more. Triggered speculation continued municipal land redevelopment, municipalities fattened their coffers, and some councilors found a way to easily fill their pockets and little control individuals, as will be proven. The PSOE's responsibility was not to puncture the bubble and ride, especially in his first term, on the back of affluence.
The effects of this economic policy and the economic model of brick have arrived late, but with special intensity to the heart of the financial system. As explained by economist Gonzalo Gil, who was Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain and has written one of the most remarkable books and specific about what happens (the crisis, the eternal return, Marcial Pons), the phenomenon of bubble creation is not nothing new, is well researched and generally well explained, but a posteriori. This is a recurring, whose detection is very difficult even in the case of supervisors, regulators and financial institutions develop their skills and obligations in a solvent (which is not always the case). The difference here compared to previous ones is that the bursting of the bubble has led to a global crisis and systematic, which is affecting the financial systems and real economies around the world. Should recall these origins in the time of redemption.
First, the Ministry of Economy (Luis de Guindos), for the first time in the history of contemporary crises (the 51 banks, 50% of the total existing-, 14 savings banks and 20 credit unions fallen between the second half of the 70's and early eighties, the intervention of Banesto Mario Conde and subsequent sale to Santander) has taken directly through the body with little supervisor, the nationalization of institutions, public money that are given, the solution to the problems associated with the growth of toxic real estate assets within banks and savings banks, the valuation of that crap, the name of the new managers and the end of the ancients. It has done surrounded by the big bankers (Loot, Gonzalez, Fainé ...) that have served as consultants: the fox in the henhouse.
more informationSpain asks for a ransom of up to 100,000 million for the dealerThe IMF anticipates the report which brought about the bank bailout in SpainThe Government is prepared to fight the word rescueThe 'black spots' in the financial sectorGuindos audits are required by the EU for a bailout of the bankingHow does banking helps?OPINION: This time, Europe is really on the brinkEDITORIAL: Waiting for the rescue
Second, a Minister of Finance (Cristobal Montoro), whose parliamentary speeches and statements to the media must qualify at least clumsy, always in a different tempo of Guindos, and still has not walked the halls of European machines which is deciding the future of the Spanish economy, which affects both his department (State Budget).
Third is the Economic Office of the Presidency who is who holds the secretariat of the Executive Committee for Economic Affairs in the scheme devised by its president, Mariano Rajoy. It is the first time this charge is not hosted by the Ministry of Economy. Travelers who have recently seen the owner, Alvaro Nadal, they say that it is in this last center of power (the most influential in Rajoy) in which more doubts have been expressed about the future of the euro and where they are discussed on consequences of abandoning the single currency by other countries such as Greece.
Finally there is the Bank of Spain, so far with institutional prestige, which has been marginalized, discredited and silenced, particularly in the last and most important phase of the banking crisis: nationalization of Bankia. With a governor (Miguel Angel Fernandez Ordonez) halved by the Minister of Economy in solving the difficulties of the country's fourth largest financial institution, and stigmatized by the leaders of the PP as the best possible culprit to try to diffuse the responsibility of managers Bankia, so tied to the history of the ruling party (Rodrigo Rato, the author of the economic miracle was Aznar, and Miguel Blesa, the friend of former president, who came to the dome of Bankia just for that friendship, untouched by previous financial responsibilities) and the regions more interventionist in some of the outrages that have urban on the ropes to the two largest savings banks that made the bank (Madrid, Esperanza Aguirre, and Valencia Francisco Camps).
Never the Economy Ministry had assumed so much prominence. And so little, the Bank of Spain
Many decision centers have multiplied the lost time, the contradictory statements, the parallel stories do not always coincide, different ways of understanding the solutions, and this has significantly affected the market confidence in the Spanish government (notably impaired), put into question their technical skills, and discussed the credibility of the figures contributed to Brussels, which has led to something unusual: the privatization of the banking supervisory activities, responsible for two international consulting firms to the detriment of the Bank of Spain. The new governor, Luis Linde, it will be corrected quickly if you do not want to bear the disappointment of its officers and inspectors.
What happened to all deteriorate so much?
November 2008: for the first time a president of the Spanish government (Rodríguez Zapatero) attends the summit of G20 leaders and hobnobs with Bush, Merkel ... has been invited by Sarkozy, but his presence that supports the considered one of the most effective regulation of the financial system. Precisely because of the banking crisis cited the seventies and eighties, Spain had adopted legislation and practices at that time were the envy of the world. British Prime Minister Gordon Brown praised her publicly, and hypercritical Wall Street Journal today carried a front-page the following reflection: the Spanish model is the one to take to alleviate the debacle prompted by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and nationalization of a significant part of American banking, British and German, among others.
This legislation cumulative product of the experience of people like Mariano Rubio, Luis Angel Rojo, Aristobulus of John, Angel Madroñero, Jose Luis Nunez, father of Soledad Núñez, Lt. Governor wannabe-etc. probably not considering the possibility of a long and deep as deterioration of the overall economy, as that is suffering. A crisis that has required ongoing efforts to recapitalize the banks, which has deteriorated to the extent the quality of its real estate and business assets, which are growing the overall delinquency rates above double digits.
So many contradictions in the government to call into question his technical prowess markets
Of these factors, which so far has played a decisive role has been the explosion of a housing bubble that lasted at least a decade: between 1997 and 2007 construction grew at rate of 5% per year. In those years the housing stock increased by 5.7 million households, nearly 30% of all existing and presentation of the price reached 191%. In 1998 the building was nearly 14% of overall employment in Spain, twice in Germany and five points higher than in the UK. That year, the Aznar government passes a law Soil multiplying the irrational exuberance of the building sector: all developable land is declared unless it is expressly forbidden. It favors an extraordinary boom in construction and purchases related to it. But not in the sense that defended the PP (increase the number of floors and therefore lower prices for them) but in the speculative: homes were purchased because they were not cheap but because they were expensive and in the future they would to be more. Triggered speculation continued municipal land redevelopment, municipalities fattened their coffers, and some councilors found a way to easily fill their pockets and little control individuals, as will be proven. The PSOE's responsibility was not to puncture the bubble and ride, especially in his first term, on the back of affluence.
The effects of this economic policy and the economic model of brick have arrived late, but with special intensity to the heart of the financial system. As explained by economist Gonzalo Gil, who was Deputy Governor of the Bank of Spain and has written one of the most remarkable books and specific about what happens (the crisis, the eternal return, Marcial Pons), the phenomenon of bubble creation is not nothing new, is well researched and generally well explained, but a posteriori. This is a recurring, whose detection is very difficult even in the case of supervisors, regulators and financial institutions develop their skills and obligations in a solvent (which is not always the case). The difference here compared to previous ones is that the bursting of the bubble has led to a global crisis and systematic, which is affecting the financial systems and real economies around the world. Should recall these origins in the time of redemption.
どのような経緯で、スペインの"銀行の破綻"に至ったのか?
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