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スペイン銀行元総裁は、不良債権で破綻寸前の銀行の救済対策の遅れの言い訳を弁明
El Banco de España se defiende de su lentitud con siete argumentos
Explica que el Gobierno no quiso usar apenas dinero público y que la crisis superó lo previsto
Ordóñez critica las trabas de las comunidades autónomas a las fusiones de cajas
The Bank of Spain defends his slowness with seven arguments
Explains that the Government wanted to use only public money and that the crisis exceeded expected
Ordonez criticizes the constraints of the autonomous communities mergers of banks
Miguel Jimenez Madrid 11 JUN 2012 - 14:03 CET
Explains that the Government wanted to use only public money and that the crisis exceeded expected
Ordonez criticizes the constraints of the autonomous communities mergers of banks
Miguel Jimenez Madrid 11 JUN 2012 - 14:03 CET
The Bank of Spain admits it was slow, yes, in the Spanish financial crisis, but not free. The agency has had to face today with Miguel Fernandez Ordonez has submitted a statement to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which explains the reasons for not acting more quickly to avoid deterioration of the sector which ultimately has taken to Spain to ask the rescue with its European partners to clean up the banking. The supervisor blames regulation, the government, autonomous communities and other restrictions of not being able to act faster.
The body chaired by Christine Lagarde gives good these arguments: "These are some of the factors that explain why the restructuring process was slow and why, in this complex context, the Bank of Spain had to take out a lot work and could only take action after a very laborious and cumbersome process. "
The allegations are presented Ordonez seven. The first is that the appropriate legal instruments for crisis resolution is not introduced until 2009, with the decree law that created the Bank Restructuring Fund (FROB).
Second, the deterioration of the economy has been more protracted than originally planned by all national and international institutions.
Third, the Bank of Spain notes that successive Spanish governments in power during the period decided and should be used only reconfirmed that limited public funds to rescue banks, forcing them to discard bad bank-type alternatives. We considered other options more appropriate, in part because unlike the major banks in other countries, the big Spanish banks were not affected. "This decision was made not only by the need to contain the deficit, but also and especially, by the fact that a huge increase in the deficit could lead to an acute crisis of sovereign debt, as has happened in other countries, "argues the Bank of Spain. Ordonez recognized that the decision to implement the restructuring through private solutions has many advantages, but is inevitably slower and more complex and difficult to implement than that, even being more expeditious, involve huge amounts of public resources.
Fourth, the implementation of a private solution has been particularly difficult and slow during this crisis because major international institutions may have been involved in mergers and acquisitions in the Spanish were not able to do so, restricting the private solution to the field national.
In addition, fifth, the Bank of Spain argues that during this systemic crisis was not possible to use the traditional tool of liquidation of a bank with losses for bondholders. "If Spain had been the only country to impose losses on holders of bonds of small and medium-sized entities, the funding of other Spanish banks would have seriously deteriorated health," says the Bank of Spain, which concluded that the benefits of the settlement of a number of banks would not offset the potential damage to the banking system as a whole and especially to healthier institutions.
Sixth, the corporate governance of savings banks added to the complexity of the restructuring process, affecting its speed, due to the strong presence of political and trade union on their boards and assemblies. "This problem has been mitigated by the transformation of the boxes in banks, but banks will only disappear if they lose control of their banks participated," say the allegations.
Finally, in seventh place, the fact that the autonomous communities exercise their authority to approve mergers of banks during the restructuring process, significantly slowed the process, given the need for lengthy and complex negotiations and difficult to regional governments in order to reach appropriate agreements. The Bank of Spain considers that this problem has already gone through the transformation of the boxes in banks.
The body chaired by Christine Lagarde gives good these arguments: "These are some of the factors that explain why the restructuring process was slow and why, in this complex context, the Bank of Spain had to take out a lot work and could only take action after a very laborious and cumbersome process. "
The allegations are presented Ordonez seven. The first is that the appropriate legal instruments for crisis resolution is not introduced until 2009, with the decree law that created the Bank Restructuring Fund (FROB).
Second, the deterioration of the economy has been more protracted than originally planned by all national and international institutions.
Third, the Bank of Spain notes that successive Spanish governments in power during the period decided and should be used only reconfirmed that limited public funds to rescue banks, forcing them to discard bad bank-type alternatives. We considered other options more appropriate, in part because unlike the major banks in other countries, the big Spanish banks were not affected. "This decision was made not only by the need to contain the deficit, but also and especially, by the fact that a huge increase in the deficit could lead to an acute crisis of sovereign debt, as has happened in other countries, "argues the Bank of Spain. Ordonez recognized that the decision to implement the restructuring through private solutions has many advantages, but is inevitably slower and more complex and difficult to implement than that, even being more expeditious, involve huge amounts of public resources.
Fourth, the implementation of a private solution has been particularly difficult and slow during this crisis because major international institutions may have been involved in mergers and acquisitions in the Spanish were not able to do so, restricting the private solution to the field national.
In addition, fifth, the Bank of Spain argues that during this systemic crisis was not possible to use the traditional tool of liquidation of a bank with losses for bondholders. "If Spain had been the only country to impose losses on holders of bonds of small and medium-sized entities, the funding of other Spanish banks would have seriously deteriorated health," says the Bank of Spain, which concluded that the benefits of the settlement of a number of banks would not offset the potential damage to the banking system as a whole and especially to healthier institutions.
Sixth, the corporate governance of savings banks added to the complexity of the restructuring process, affecting its speed, due to the strong presence of political and trade union on their boards and assemblies. "This problem has been mitigated by the transformation of the boxes in banks, but banks will only disappear if they lose control of their banks participated," say the allegations.
Finally, in seventh place, the fact that the autonomous communities exercise their authority to approve mergers of banks during the restructuring process, significantly slowed the process, given the need for lengthy and complex negotiations and difficult to regional governments in order to reach appropriate agreements. The Bank of Spain considers that this problem has already gone through the transformation of the boxes in banks.
スペイン銀行元総裁は、不良債権で破綻寸前の銀行の救済対策の遅れの言い訳を弁明
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